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I.     INTRODUCTION
“This book will be the definitive work on the debt crisis”. [Paul Volcker on the
back-cover of William R. Cline, 1995, International Debt Reexamined (Washington
D.C.: Institute for International Economics).] – The idea for this paper emerged in
August 1998 when Russia defaulted on large parts of its domestic (and, at the
beginning of 1999, on its foreign) debt. The first paragraphs were written while
Pakistan defaulted on foreign bank and bond debt (end 1998, beginning 1999). The
paper progressed as Ecuador announced the first-ever default on Brady Bonds in
August 1999 and as Indonesia’s economic and political situation deteriorated to such
an extent that it eventually had to default on foreign debt (April 2000). The conclusion
is written while a depression-plagued Argentine government – amidst serious social
unrest – declares the largest sovereign default in history (December 2001).
As sovereign debt crises continue to be a major concern for international
financial markets and economic policy makers, this paper launches a new
investigation into the determinants of sovereign default with the purpose of estimating
default probabilities for emerging market governments (or “sovereigns”). These
sovereign default probabilities are then compared with the default rates associated
with the sovereign credit ratings of the two leading rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s
and Moody’s Investors Service.
Sovereign default probabilities can be useful for at least two reasons. First,
they can be used to monitor the financial vulnerability of emerging market economies.
The threat of possible (re-) payment problems of an emerging market government is
very often at the source of financial market turbulence in such countries. Interestingly,
the recent literature on the determinants ("early warnings indicators") of financial
crises and contagion focuses almost exclusively on currency and banking crises and
not directly on sovereign (re-)financing difficulties or default itself.
1 At a recent
“Economic Forum” organized by the IMF, one of the panelists, Kristin Forbes (MIT
and U.S. Treasury), criticized this focus somewhat by saying: “What we should care
about and what I’d like to see more work go into is models predicting things such as
external financing difficulties and financial systems vulnerabilities, just as a few
examples”.
2 This paper intends to address that gap in the literature.
Second, all major internationally operating banks use default probabilities to
price bonds and loans, to feed their value-at-risk type credit risk management models,
and to determine their complex customer and country exposure limits. Moreover,
according to the current version of the New Basel Capital Accord
3, banks will be
allowed to use credit ratings and the corresponding default rates to determine the
amount of regulatory capital they have to set aside against their credit risks. Thus,
credit ratings and associated default rates play a crucial role in international capital
                                                
1 See, for example, Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky (2000), Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Berg and Pattillo (1998), Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Kaminsky (1998),
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), Honohan (1997), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997),
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), Frankel and Rose (1996).
2 See International Monetary Fund (2001)
3 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001).4
allocation. However, the problem is that there are no good sovereign default
probabilities available. Consequently, international banks use corporate default rates
collected by commercial rating agencies, such as Moody’s Investors Service
(“Moody’s”) or Standard and Poor’s (“S&P”), as proxies for sovereign default
probabilities. Are they good proxies? This research uses the information contained in
arrears and rescheduling data published by the World Bank, constructs a logit panel
model to estimate probabilities of sovereign default and concludes that these proxies
seem to underestimate sovereign default risk considerably.
The term “emerging markets” is used here similarly as most country credit risk
managers use it. It encompasses generally all countries whose sovereign credit rating
is A+ (on S&P’s scale; A1 on Moody’s scale) or lower. Exceptions to this rule are
usually Singapore (AAA with S&P’s, Aa1 with Moody’s) and Taiwan (AA with
S&P’s, Aa3 with Moody’s), which are included in the list mainly for locational and
political reasons. On the other hand, Greece (A with S&P’s, A2 with Moody’s) has
been dropped from the list upon joining the European Monetary Union. Apart from
these exceptions, emerging markets are essentially all non-industrialized and
transition economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a
review of the more recent literature on the determinants of sovereign debt-servicing
difficulties. Section III discusses the methodology used. First, the dependent variable
(“sovereign default”) is defined. Then, an empirical logit model is specified, the
explanatory variables entering the model are discussed, and the sample as well as the
data is described. Section IV presents the most important findings. It discusses the
statistical and economic significance of the explanatory variables and evaluates the in-
and out-of-sample prediction accuracy of the model. Eventually, it compares the
estimated and predicted default probabilities at two moments in time – before the
Asian Crisis (end 1996) and at the beginning of 2001 – with the default rates
associated with Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit ratings. Section V
concludes and draws some policy implications.
II.     REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Since the early 1970s and especially since the beginning of the debt crisis in
1982, an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of
sovereign defaults has developed. Some authors - and especially internationally
operating banks - forged the concept of “country (sovereign) risk analysis” to describe
the process of identifying economic and political determinants and using them to form
some qualified statement about the likelihood of a developing country experiencing
external debt repayment problems. As the main goal of the paper is to estimate default
probabilities of emerging market sovereigns, this review focuses on the empirical
literature. However, readers interested in obtaining a quick overview of the broader
issues related to sovereign debt are referred to Arora (1993). Theoretical treatments of
sovereign debt and sovereign risk can be found in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Eaton
and Fernandez (1995), Eaton, Gersowitz, and Stiglitz (1986), and especially Cohen
(1991). An excellent early systematic study of factors influencing a country’s ability
to service its foreign debt is Avramovic (1964). Ciarrapico (1992), finally, presents
the theory of country risk from a more applied perspective.5
Useful surveys of the empirical literature on sovereign debt repayment
difficulties are Cline, W. R. (1995), Avery and Fisher (1992), Saini, Krishan G and
Bates (1984), and McDonald (1982) and those contained in Aylward and Thorne
(1998), in Babbel (1996), in Ciarrapico (1992), and in Solberg (1988). With the
exception of Aylward and Thorne (1998), however, these surveys only cover
empirical investigations written up to the mid-1980s. Thus, the strategy in this section
is to discuss, (1), the important empirical studies written in the field since the mid-
1980s and, (2), other empirical studies written since then but not surveyed in Aylward
and Thorne (1998).
4 Tables 1a to 1c give a synopsis of those studies. The first row
identifies the papers. They are ordered according to, first, how they define the
dependent variable and, second, their publication date. The next four rows show that
they can be classified into four different groups with respect to how they define the
dependent variable. The next 28 rows list the most frequently used explanatory
variables and the columns indicate which of them haven been chosen by each of the
authors. The mention “pos” means that the coefficient of the corresponding variable
had a positive sign and was significant. “(pos)”, on the other hand, means that the
coefficient had a positive sign but was not significant, and similarly with “neg” and
“(neg)”. Below the explanatory variables, some goodness-of-fit measures, the
estimation method and, eventually, the dimensions of each of the panel studies are
reported.
What all of the surveyed studies (and most of the earlier papers mentioned in
footnote 4) have in common is that they formulate the dependent variable (“debt
service difficulty”, “debt crisis” or “default”) as a binary outcome, which takes on a
value of 1 if the event (e.g. default) takes place and 0 otherwise. As a consequence,
the functional relationship between the dependent variable and its determinants is
modelled as a logit or probit model and panel discrete choice methods are used to
estimate the coefficients of these models.
The remark by Aylward and Thorne (1998) with respect to the selection of
determinants in the studies surveyed in their paper is also valid for a majority of the
papers summarized in table 1: “The results of [the] work [by Avramovic (1964)] – the
identification of short-term liquidity factors (the so-called traditional debt or financial
ratios: debt/GDP, debt service/exports, reserves/imports) and longer-term indicators
of economic health and growth (GDP growth rate, investment, exports, inflation) –
seem to have guided the selection of variables in many of the subsequent empirical
analyses of external debt repayment behavior.”
5
Some studies – representing the so-called “ability-to-pay” approach – try to
derive the binary dependent variable as well as the relevant determinants from
theoretical models. Cline, W. (1984) and subsequently McFadden, Eckaus, Feder,
Hajivassiliou, and O'Connell (1985), Hajivassiliou, V. A. (1987), Hajivassiliou, V.
(1989), and Hajivassiliou, V. (1994) model the occurrence of a debt servicing
difficulty as a situation of disequilibrium in international credit markets where the
                                                
4 The more important of these earlier studies include Berg and Sachs (1988), Edwards (1984),
Feder, Just, and Ross (1981), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Saini, Krishan G. and Bates (1978),
Feder and Just (1977), Sargen (1977), and Frank and Cline (1971).
5 Aylward and Thorne (1998), p. 12.6
demand for new loans to service existing debt exceeds the supply at the upper ceiling
interest rate at which bankers are willing to lend.
6 The determinants of debt default are
then equal to the determinants of the demand for and the supply of new loans: Any
factor that shifts the demand curve for new loans to the right and/or the supply curve
of foreign credit to the left will tend to increase the probability of the emergence of a
non-market clearing gap between demand and supply at the interest rate ceiling. Thus,
as long as demand and supply curves cross below or at the interest rate ceiling, the
country is able to borrow new funds to service its debt and, hence, does not default.
However, if some factors shift the demand and/or supply curves such that the
intersection lies above the interest rate ceiling, the country is unable to fully refinance
itself and has no other option than to default. The binary choice (logit or probit) model
is then interpreted as a reduced form model of this market for foreign credit.
Lee (1991), on the other hand, applies a “willingness-to-pay” approach,
pioneered by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Eaton et al. (1986). He models the event
of a sovereign default as the outcome of a utility maximizing cost-benefit calculation
by a sovereign borrower: a country defaults on its external debt if the expected value
of the discounted utility of consumption with default exceeds the expected value of
the discounted utility of consumption with debt service, and otherwise services its
external debt. However, this willingness-to-pay approach does not necessarily have to
be seen as an alternative to the foreign credit market – or ability-to-pay – approach
above. It can be a complement in the sense that as long as the credit market clears at
or below the interest rate ceiling, the willingness-to-pay is the binding constraint.
Above the ceiling, the ability-to-pay determines the outcome.
Eventually, it is interesting to note that all these studies end up selecting
determinants that are similar to those identified by Avramovic (1964) and subsequent
empirical investigations on a less rigorous theoretical basis.
The most important difference among the studies summarized in table 1 is the
definition of the dichotomous dependent variable, i.e. the definition of what
constitutes a “debt servicing difficulty”. Four different definitions have been
identified among the 15 studies of table 1, depending on whether a country
experiences one or more of three well defined expressions of a debt servicing
problem: (1) a debt rescheduling negotiation or agreement, (2) arrears on interest
payments or on principal repayments, and (3) an “upper-tranche” IMF agreement.
7 In
all studies but one (Aylward and Thorne (1998)), the rescheduling element is present
in the definition. Cline, W. (1984), Citron and Nickelsburg (1987), Lee (1991),
Balkan (1992), Odedokun (1995), Marashaden (1997), and Rivoli and Brewer (1997)
all define a debt servicing difficulty observation as a year in which a country
reschedules its external debt. Hajivassiliou, V. A. (1987) and Li (1992) add the upper-
tranche IMF agreement element to the definition. They assign the value of 1 to the
dependent variable if a country reschedules its debt in a given year or concludes an
upper-tranche IMF agreement. If neither of these two signs of external debt repayment
problems is present, the corresponding country-year is assigned the value 0. Callier
(1985) and Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2000), instead, add the arrears element to
the definition. But while Callier (1985) considers the presence of arrears on imports or
on interest as an expression of a debt-servicing problem, Detragiache and Spilimbergo
                                                
6 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for a theory of credit rationing.
7 For an exact definition of the latter, see Treasurer's Department (1998).7
(2000) require the stock of arrears to be larger than a certain threshold before they
qualify a debt servicing problem as a “debt crisis”. Their dependent variable takes on
the value of 1 if either or both of the following conditions occur: (1) the stock of
arrears of principal or interest on external obligations towards private creditors
exceeds 5% of total long-term debt service due; (2) there is a rescheduling or debt
restructuring agreement with private creditors as listed in the World Bank publications
Global Development Finance.
The default definition of McFadden et al. (1985), Hajivassiliou, V. (1989), and 
Hajivassiliou, V. (1994), eventually, comprises all three elements: a country
experiences a debt repayment problem in a given year (i.e. dependent variable = 1) if
(1) it reschedules its debt with private or official creditors or, (2) it enters an IMF
upper-tranche agreement or, (3) its stock of accumulated arrears is “significant”,
which is defined as interest arrears exceeding 0.1% of total external debt or principal
arrears exceeding 1% of total external debt. Aylward and Thorne (1998), eventually,
analyse separately countries’ repayment performance towards the IMF and other
creditors. To our knowledge, theirs is the only study in the literature to define the
occurrence of an external repayment problem as the simple presence of arrears on
interest or principal. For the purposes of this paper, all of these definitions have
certain drawbacks. Section III A explains why and specifies a definition that seems
more appropriate.
As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, table 1 makes clear that
there are not even two studies with exactly the same determinants of debt servicing
difficulties. Despite these differences, some summary conclusions may be drawn.
First, the three determinants that are most often tested and seem most consistently to
be significant are the so-called financial ratios reserves/imports, total external
debt/GDP, and – to a lesser extent – total debt service due/exports. Second, as far as
the indicators of the macroeconomic situation and policy stance are concerned, the
results are mixed: GDP growth or GDP per capita growth, current account
balance/GDP, inflation, and measures of exchange rate overvaluation have been found
significantly associated with debt servicing capacity in some studies, but insignificant
in others. Third, where the lagged dependent variable has been included among the
determinants, it has been found highly significant. Fourth, only few studies (Citron
and Nickelsburg (1987), Balkan (1992), Li (1992), Rivoli and Brewer (1997)) tried to
test the significance of political variables even though such factors are generally
acknowledged to be important.
For the investigations in this paper, we use the list of explanatory variables in
table 1 as a starting point for the selection of determinants. In particular, we construct
and test an indicator of exchange rate misalignment and use a set of political risk
indicators
8 as potential determinants of sovereign defaults that have not yet been used
in the literature. Section III C provides the details about the explanatory variables
chosen in this paper.
Concerning the goodness-of-fit of the empirical models surveyed in table 1,
Aylward and Thorne (1998) achieve the best performance with a model that classifies
                                                
8 “Political Risk Points by Component”, published by The PRS Group in their monthly
publication International Country Risk Guide.8
94.78% of debt defaults and non-defaults correctly (in sample). Moreover, the
percentage of type I errors (i.e. actual defaults classified by the model as non-defaults)
and the percentage of type II errors (i.e. actual non-defaults classified by the model as
defaults) are very low: 8% and 3% respectively. Very similar results are achieved by
Balkan (1992), which includes political variables, with 94.6% of correct
classifications and type I and type II errors of 7.3% and 5.2%, respectively.
As to the period analyzed, eventually, most of the studies cover some period
between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, the only exception being Detragiache
and Spilimbergo (2000), which cover the period 1971-1998. However, in their paper,
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2000) study financial crises in a broader sense and the
analysis of the determinants of debt defaults is a mere by-product. Thus, given the
lack of a systematic study of the determinants of debt repayment problems covering
the period since the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, this paper intends to make a
contribution towards filling that gap.
A closely related, but nevertheless distinct, empirical literature analyzes the
determinants of sovereign creditworthiness ratings, such as Moody’s “country
ceilings”, Standard & Poor’s “sovereign credit ratings” or the country risk ratings
produced by the Institutional Investor, Euromoney, the Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU), and the PRS (Political Risk Services) Group. An early example of this
literature is Feder and Uy (1985). More recent studies in this field include Oral,
Kettani, Cosset, and Daouas (1992), Lee (1993), Sommerville and Taffler (1995),
Cantor and Packer (1996), Haque, Nadeem Ul, Kumar, Mark, and Mathieson (1996),
and Haque, Nadeem U., Mark, and Mathieson (1998), and Jüttner and McCarthy
(2000).While the literature on sovereign debt repayment problems tries to analyze the
likelihood of such a problem and its determinants directly, this literature does it
indirectly by analyzing the determinants of country creditworthiness ratings, which
are indicators of how international investors perceive the likelihood of a repayment
problem. Ideally, i.e. if the various rating agencies manage to integrate the relevant
information into their sovereign ratings, these two strings of the literature should find
the same determinants. A companion paper, Peter (2002), will elaborate on the
observation that this is not really the case.
III.     EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION
A.  Definition of the Dependent Variable: Sovereign Default
This paper attempts to derive external debt default probabilities for emerging
market sovereigns. How do international capital markets define the term “default”?
The two leading rating agencies and market specialists in debt default problems,
Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s, define “default” as (1) “any
missed or delayed payment of interest and/or principal or (2) any exchange where the
debtor offers the creditor a new contract that amounts to a diminished financial
obligation (e.g., preferred or common stock, debt with a lower coupon or par amount,
or a less liquid deposit either because of a change in maturity or currency of
denomination, or required credit maintenance facilities) or (3) where the exchange has9
the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default.”
9 The first part, “…any
missed or delayed payments of interest and/or principal…”, clearly indicates that the
accumulation of interest and/or principal repayment arrears constitutes a default. The
second part, “…a new contract that amounts to a diminished financial obligation…”
can be considered as a definition of a rescheduling agreement, which constitutes a
default as well. In this sense, it seems appropriate to focus on debt payment arrears
and rescheduling arrangements as expressions of default.
Data on the number and nature of individual rescheduling arrangements
between developing country governments and their creditors are not readily available.
They have to be tediously compiled from various sources. For large panel studies, this
implies very large costs.
10 Additionally, as Cline, W. (1984), p. 207, notes, debt
reschedulings are usually preceded by the accumulation of arrears on debt payments.
This implies that any definition of default should attribute priority to the accumulation
of arrears. Reschedulings are only important to the extent that they take place
independently of arrears. In the absence of easily accessible information on individual
rescheduling arrangements, we use the data series “total amounts of debt rescheduled
(US$)” that can be found on the World Bank CD-ROM Global Development Finance
(GDF)
11. The question of whether any amount of “debt rescheduled” constitutes a
default is treated below.
Data on arrears (on long-term debt) of interest and principal, on the other
hand, is now available on the GDF CD-ROM. One of the possible explanations why
only few of the surveyed studies used arrears data to define their dependent variable is
that the World Bank publishes them only since 1989-90. McFadden et al. (1985),
Hajivassiliou, V. (1989) and Hajivassiliou, V. (1994) could make use of arrears data
because they had privileged access to confidential World Bank files, as they note in
their papers. Looking at principal and interest arrears data for the 138 countries
covered on the GDF 1999 CD-ROM, one might be surprised about the pervasiveness
and amounts of interest and principal arrears towards public and private creditors.
This raises the question of whether any amount of accumulated arrears should be
considered as a default (see Aylward and Thorne (1998)) – in which case there would
be many more country-years in default than not! – or whether some minimum
threshold amount should be crossed before arrears would be classified as debt default
(e.g. 0.1% of total external debt for interest arrears and 1% of total external debt for
principal arrears in McFadden et al. (1985) or 5% of total long-term debt service due
for the sum of interest and principal arrears in Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2000)).
This paper argues that relatively small amounts of arrears do not threaten the
functioning of international credit markets or might even occur out of inadvertence.
Hence the imposition of a threshold seems justified. Imposing a threshold to the stock
of accumulated arrears seems problematic, though. Suppose we set the default
threshold for the stock of total (i.e. interest and principal) arrears at 1% of total
external debt. Suppose further that country X incurs arrears worth 2% of total debt in
                                                
9 See Moody's Investors Service (1999b), p. 1. For S&P’s (similar) definition, see Standard &
Poor's (1999b), p. 10.
10 All of the surveyed studies that used rescheduling arrangements in their definition (except
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2000)) had to go this way.
11 The code of this series is DT.TXR.DPPG.CD.10
year t and then reduces this stock of arrears at such a rate that it drops below the 2%
threshold in year t+4. According to this rule, country X would be classified as
defaulting on its external debt for three subsequent years while, in reality, it started to
dismantle its stock of arrears from year t+1 on. A country that reduces its arrears stock
relative to total debt must either have the resources to service its debt or must have
benefited from some kind of debt reduction scheme. Both cases would be judged as
positive developments by capital markets and the classification of country X as being
in default in year t+1, t+2 and t+3 would seem unjustified.
To avoid that problem, this paper defines the default threshold in terms of
increases in the stock of arrears. An emerging market sovereign (i.e. a government) is
considered to default on its external debt in a given year if either or both of conditions
(1) and (2), plus condition (3), are fulfilled:
(1) the increase in the stock of total (i.e. interest and principal) arrears (on long-
term debt) towards official and private creditors exceeds 2% of total external
debt;
(2) the total amount of (long-term) debt rescheduled in a given year exceeds 2.5%
of total external debt;
(3) if (2) is fulfilled but, at the same time, the stock of total arrears (in US$ terms)
decreases by more than the total amount of debt rescheduled (in US$ terms),
the observation does not count as default.
If these conditions are fulfilled for a given country-year, the dependent









Condition (3) should allow us to avoid classifying as default an observation
where a country had a significant amount of debt rescheduled (i.e. defaulted according
to condition (2)) but, at the same time, managed to decrease it’s stock of arrears by
more than the amount rescheduled. The threshold of 2% in condition (1) and that of
2.5% in condition (2) correspond roughly to the sample means of the two correspond-
ding data series (i.e. increase in total arrears and total amounts of debt rescheduled,
both as a percentage of total external debt). As is the case for the thresholds imposed
by the studies surveyed in table 1, these ones are also arbitrary. However, there are
two points to be noted.
First, we also tried thresholds of 1.5% and 3% for both series but neither the
number of defaults identified nor the estimation results changed significantly. Second,
with these two thresholds for the increase in total arrears and the total amount of debt
rescheduled, we interestingly obtain a number of sovereign defaults per year that is
reasonably close to the number counted by Standard & Poor’s in their most recent
sovereign default survey.
12 For the 150 countries of table 2,
13 figure 1 compares the
                                                
12 See Standard & Poor's (2001c), p. 94. Standard & Poor's is the only rating agency that
publishes detailed sovereign default statistics so far. The only other source for historical data
on sovereign defaults that we could identify is Beim and Calomiris (2001), pp. 32-36. The
sovereign defaults listed in this textbook correspond closely to those identified by S&P's.
if country i defaults in year t
if country i does not default in year t11
number of sovereign defaults obtained by the above definition with the number
identified by Standard & Poor’s over the period 1981-1997. From 1985 on, the
distribution of defaults per year as well as the total number of defaults identified by
our own definition (total number 1985-97: 664) is fairly similar to the distribution and
total number identified by S&P’s (total number 1985-97: 649). The major difference
in the number of defaults occurs at the beginning of the period of analysis, between
1981 and 1984, with S&P’s identifying many more defaults (135) than we do (42).
This seems largely due to the fact that at the outset of the debt crisis, the increase in
the stock of arrears of defaulting countries was relatively small compared to the
outstanding external debt, resulting in many instances where the threshold of 2% in
terms of total external debt is not crossed. For reasons explained in section III D,
potential bias problems are minimized as the years 1981 to 1983 are, anyway,
excluded from our sample.
B.  Econometric Model
Following the literature in the field, we combine the various default
determinants of ability- and willingness-to-pay approaches (see table 1) and derive a
(binary choice) reduced-form model that expresses the probability of default as a
function of these (economic and political) determinants. The binary choice model is
derived in the following steps.
Consider a random sample of N emerging market countries (or sovereigns), i =
1,…, N. Each sovereign i is observed over T periods, t = 1,..., T. Assume that there
exists an unobservable (continuous random) variable
*
it y that indicates whether
sovereign i defaults in year t. Assume that this unobservable indicator 
*
it y  is a linear
function of a vector of k (exogenous) determinants, it x , of a constant  aand of a
random error term it e
*
ititit ya e =++ b'x , (2)
whereb is a  ) 1 ( · k vector of parameters.
As to the random error term, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that
all it e are independent and identically distributed across countries and over time and
have zero mean and unit variance, i.e.
it e ~ i.i.d.[ ] 0,1  for all i and t. (3)
Second, we assume that these errors it e have a logistic distribution,
it e ~  [ ] 0,1 L . (4)


















                                                                                                                                           
13 See section III D for details about the sample and the data.12
which implies that its probability density function (PDF) is
( )





















wherem = mean and



















The assumption of the errors being i.i.d. (equation 3) yields the simplest
possible “panel” model.
14 The assumption of a unit variance is an innocent
normalization.
15 The assumption of logistically distributed error terms (equation 4)
yields the logit model. If the errors were assumed to be standard normal instead, we
would obtain a probit model.
16
Next, we assume that a country defaults if the unobservable default indicator is
greater than one, i.e. if
* 0 it y > , and that it does not if















Equation (8) helps us to introduce our binary (and observed!) dependent variable of
equation (1) into the model. Thus, the probability of observing a sovereign default in
year t, i.e. the probability that  1 it d = , is
* Prob(1)Prob(0)Prob('0) itititit dya e ==>=++> bx
Prob(') itit a e =>-- bx .
Using equation (7) and the property of the logistic distribution function, ? , to be































p a = and 
3
p = ßb .
                                                
14 „Panel“, in quotation marks, because this error assumption effectively ignores the panel
structure of the data. A more realistic modelling of the error term is considered in further
research.
15 See Greene (2000), p.819, for more details about this normalization.
16 The two distributions are similar. The standardized logistic distribution has slightly heavier
tails than the standard normal distribution. In effect, it closely resembles a t-distribution with
seven degrees of freedom. We used both logit and probit models in the analysis. But since the
results were similar, we preferred to work with the much simpler logistic distribution.13
Assuming  it e  to be i.i.d. across countries and over time (equation 3) and using
equations (9) and (10), the (unconditional) joint probability, or likelihood, function for


























The constanta and the parameter vectorßcan be estimated by maximizing the
likelihood function with respect to these parameters and solve for them iteratively.
17
While we are interested in these parameters in order to analyze which
determinants are significant and in order to calculate sovereign default probabilities,
we have to be aware of the fact that they are not the marginal effects we are used to
obtain in linear models. Binary choice models are non-linear in the parameters and in
the explanatory variables. Fortunately, however, the simplicity of the logit model
allows us to obtain closed-form solutions of these marginal effects. Let  , itk x be the kth
element of the determinant vector  it x , and let k b  be the kth element of ß. Then the
partial derivative of the sovereign default probability, Prob(1) it d = , with respect




















A comparison of equation (12) with equation (6) tells us that the marginal impact of
the kth determinant on the default probability is a function of the logistic PDF of the











, and of the coefficient of this
determinant,  k b . In other words, the marginal effects (or “slopes”) of each
determinant do not only depend on the size of this determinant at the point of
evaluation but also on the sizes of all other determinants at that point. In interpreting
the importance of the determinants, we will thus have to evaluate these slopes at
certain values of the explanatory variables. As is commonly done with logit models,
we will evaluate the marginal effects at the sample means of the determinants.
Eventually, let us modify the model slightly in order to make it more
“forward-looking” and to limit potential endogeneity problems. We are interested in
how the vector of determinants x at time t determines country i’s probability of
                                                
17 For more details about the logit and other binary choice models and their estimation, see
Maddala (1983). For an introduction into the problems of estimating discrete dependent
variable models in a panel context, see chapter 19 in Greene (2000), and Arellano and Honore
(2001). For more advanced treatments of how to estimate dynamic discrete choice models and
how to take into account the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, see Heckman (1981) and
Honore and Kyriazidou (2000).14
default in year t and/or the near to medium term future. In other words, we want to
determine to what extent the knowledge of a country’s economic and political
situation today helps us to determine the likelihood of default by this country in the
near future (“early warning tool”). Thus, the binary dependent variable  it d defined in
equation (1) is slightly modified:d for country i will take on the value 1 if country i









This formulation of the dependent variable could be interpreted as some kind
of smoothing and takes account of the fact that it is very difficult to predict the precise
timing of a sovereign default. Rather, a certain number of economic and political
“fundamentals” might indicate repayment problems over some years ahead.
Therefore, it seems interesting to investigate how many years ahead these
determinants seem to have some bearing. In order to limit complexity and the loss of
observations, we have chosen p = 2. Consequently, the six resulting definitions of the

















































As a consequence, the unobservable and random sovereign default
indicator
*
it y will be re-interpreted as indicating whether sovereign i defaults over the
period t until t+2 and re-written
*
;...2 itt y + . All other equations will be adjusted


















i.e. for each country i, the vector of (country-specific and global) explanatory
variables in year t ,  it x , determines the probability that country i will default at
if country i defaults over the period t until t+p
if country i does not default over the period t until t+p.
if country i defaults in year t
if country i does not default in year t.
if country i defaults in year t+2
if country i does not default in year t+2
if country i defaults at least once over the period t ‘til t+1
if country i does not default over the period t ‘til t+1
if country i defaults at least once over the period t+1 ‘til t+2
if country i does not default over the period t ‘til t+2.
if country i defaults at least once over the period t ‘til t+2
if country i does not default over the period t until t+2.
if country i defaults in year t+1
if country i does not default in year t+1.15
various horizons between t and t+2. The next section discusses the determinant vector
it x .
C.  Explanatory Variables
Among the many potentially relevant model specifications implied by the
sovereign default determinants listed in table 1, we have chosen the one that fulfilled
the following conditions: (1) the chosen determinants are individually and jointly
significant in the equation; (2) all determinants show the expected sign; and (3) the fit
to the data is maximized. The best results were obtained by a specification that
includes the 11 variables listed below. For each of them, a brief description specifies
how it is expected to be correlated with the occurrence of sovereign default:
1.  CAGDPN = current account balance as a % of GDP
￿  Expected parameter: negative. An improving current account
position reduces the dependence on foreign savings, slows down
the increase in the (net) foreign debt stock (if CAGDPN is less
negative from one period to the other) or even reduces the (net)
foreign debt stock (if CAGDPN is positive from one period to the
next) and, thus, reduces the likelihood of a default on foreign debt.
Conversely, for countries with large current account deficits, any
shock disrupting a country’s access to international financial
markets will compound the problem of servicing maturing debt
with that of finding a substitute for the real resource transfer the
country relied upon. Hence, the larger the current account deficit
relative to GDP, the higher the probability of experiencing debt-
servicing difficulties.
2.  LDEBST2 = debt stock indicator, comprising the total debt/GNP ratio and the
total debt/exports of goods and services ratio at the end of the previous year
18
￿  Expected parameter: positive, since an increasing debt stock,
compared to the resource base (whether GDP, GNP or export
earnings), increases the likelihood that the debt is unsustainable
and, hence, of default.
3.  LARREDT = total accumulated arrears (on interest payments and principal
repayments to official and private creditors) as a % of total external debt at the end
of the previous year.
￿  Expected parameter: positive, since the higher the stock of already
accumulated arrears, the higher the risk of further defaults.
4.  M2IR = money and quasi money (M2) to gross international reserves ratio
19
                                                
18 LDEBST2 = (DGNPt-1-µDGNP)/s DGNP + (DEXPt-1-µDEXP)/sDEXP, where DGNP and DEXP are
the total debt-GNP ratio and the total debt-exports ratio, respectively, and where µ and s are
the respective sample means and standard deviations.
19 Other indicators of reserve adequacy have been tested (international reserves in months of
imports, international reserves to short-term external debt), but were found to be insignificant.16
￿  Expected parameter: positive. In a fixed or managed floating
exchange rate regime (i.e. the situation of most developing
countries), the ratio of M2 (in US$) to foreign reserves is a measure
of the extent of un-backed implicit government (i.e. central bank)
liabilities.
20 The higher the stock of money (M2) compared to
international reserves, the higher the probability that a sudden loss
in confidence in a country’s currency leads to a
liquidity/currency/balance-of-payments crisis and/or an external
debt default.
21
5.  CRPRIV = credit to private sector (% of GDP)
￿  Expected parameter: positive, since the higher the indebtedness of
the private sector compared to the size of the economy, the higher
the likelihood of mass private defaults (e.g. by large banks or
companies/conglomerates) in case of a cyclical downturn, hence
the higher the probability of a banking crisis, which may force the
government to bail out large banks and, thereby, to slither itself
into payment difficulties.
6.  CPIINF2 = consumer price inflation (% change, average)
￿  Expected parameter: positive. A high rate of inflation points to
structural problems in the government’s finances. When a
government appears unable or unwilling to pay for current
expenditure through taxes or debt issuance, it must resort to
printing money. This will lead to inflation, which in turn will
reduce the (non-indexed) outstanding domestic debt. Inflationary
finance can be interpreted as default on domestic debt. Thus, as an
indicator of fiscal (and monetary) policy (mis-) management,
higher inflation rates might indicate a higher probability of default
on external debt as well, in spite of the government’s inability to
inflate away foreign currency denominated debt.
22
7.  (DRER2HP)^2 = squared percentage deviation of real exchange rate (vis-à-vis the
US$) from long-run trend
23
￿  Expected parameter: positive. On one hand, if a currency is sharply
overvalued, there is a high risk of a currency crisis that may lead to
a debt crisis. On the other hand, a strong under-valuation of a
currency (e.g. caused by a sharp devaluation as a result of a
currency crisis) implies a large real external debt burden in terms of
                                                
20 See Calvo and Mendoza (1996), pp. 243 and 249.
21 According to Calvo (1996), the M2-interntional reserves ratio is a good predictor of a
country’s vulnerability to balance of payments crises.
22 As the benefit of inflation rates below 2% is doubtful, we actually put a lower bound of 2%
to all inflation rates. For instance, instead of Ethiopia’s actual inflation rate in 1996 of –5.1%,
the value entered in the model was 2%.
23 Our measure of the long-run trend real exchange rate is the Hodrick-Prescott filtered real
exchange rate index, calculated as the relative consumer prices expressed in country i’s
currency. The idea of this measure of misalignment is similar to the ones used in Frankel and
Rose (1996) or Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), except for the calculation of the trend.17
domestic currency. Thus, the larger the deviations of the real
exchange rate from long run trend, the higher the risk of default.
The fact that drer2hp is squared implies that the risk of default
increases more than proportionately as the deviation increases. We
first tried with the absolute value of drer2hp but in this form, the
variable was not significant. The squared value of drer2hp,
however, turned out to be significant. The same was true for
(|drer2hp|)^3 and (drer2hp)^4, where the level of significance was
even slightly higher.
8.  VGNPCAPG2 = variability of GNP-per-capita growth, calculated as the standard
deviation of GNP-per-capita growth over the preceding 7 years.
￿  Expected parameter: positive, since the more a country’s output
fluctuates, the higher the probability that in a given year the
country might not have (or might not be willing to make available
for debt service) the necessary resources to pay interest and/or
principal, i.e. the higher the probability that it defaults.
9.  POLRISK6 = political risk index, calculated as the sum of six “political risk
components” published monthly by the PRS-Group, i.e. POLRISK6 =
CORRUPT+SOCECO+INVPROF+ MILIT+ETHNIC+DEMO, whereby
•  CORRUPT = index of corruption within the political system (ranging
between 0 = heavy corruption, and 6 = virtually no corruption)
•  SOCECO = index of a country’s socioeconomic conditions (0-12)
•  INVPROF = index of a country’s investment profile (0-12)
•  MILIT = index of involvement of the military in politics (0-6)
•  ETHNIC = index of the degree of ethnic tensions in a country (0-6)
•  DEMO = index of a government’s democratic accountability (0-6)
POLRISK6 thus has a potential range from 0 (= very high political risk) to 48
(very low political risk).
￿  Expected parameter: negative, since the more “difficult” the
political situation as indicated by the six components of our
political risk indicator (i.e. the lower the indicator) in a country, the
higher the probability of default.
10. LIB6MRE1 = real interest rate on international lending, calculated as 6-months
LIBOR on U.S. dollar deposits minus expected U.S. consumer price inflation.
24
This is actually not a country-specific but an international factor that affects all
countries in the same way.
￿  Expected parameter: positive, since the higher the cost of
borrowing and/or of interest payments (for variable debt), the
higher the probability of default
11. L3DOREDT3ME = lagged dependent variable (lag length = 3), i.e. this indicator
has a value of 1 if the country had defaulted over the past three years and 0
                                                
24 In the estimation, we used actual U.S. CPI inflation over the following year.18
otherwise. As such, this variable can also be interpreted as an indicator of
repayment performance over the recent past.
￿  Expected parameter: positive, since default data show a high
degree of positive auto-correlation, i.e. the probability that a
country will default in the future if it has defaulted in the past, or
that it won’t default in the future if it hasn’t defaulted in the past, is
very high.
D.  Sample and Data
As noted in section II, this paper intends to study sovereign defaults since the
onset of the debt crisis in 1982. We thus start our analysis by taking all 138 countries
covered in the 1999 issue of the World Bank’s Global Development Finance on CD-
ROM, the most comprehensive database on external indebtedness of developing
countries. These are the countries that are aligned left in table 2. To these countries,
we add the 12 emerging markets Bahrain, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, Libya,
Namibia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, Taiwan, and United Arab
Emirates (countries aligned right in table 2), which are not covered in GDF but are
considered to be important emerging markets and, hence, are covered in EIU
CountryData on CD-ROM.
25 Data on external debt, arrears and amounts of debt
rescheduled are from these two sources. Data on economic variables are from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM and from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators 1999 on CD-ROM. Data on political risk indicators are
from PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (various issues).
26
Given the two-year lag of GDF data and the availability of the political risk
indicators only as of 1984, our analysis is constrained to the period 1984-1997 – at
best. Due to missing data, the eventual sample we end up with is an unbalanced panel
containing anything from one to 14 time-series observations for only 78 of the 150
emerging markets. In all estimations, the actual number of observations floated
around 720 observations. The 78 emerging markets eventually analyzed are yellow-
shaded in table 2. Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics for the 11 explanatory
variables discussed in section C.
Following Eichengreen et al. (1996), the empirical currency crisis literature
usually excludes a few years of observations after a crisis has started (“windowing
technique”) in order to account for possible structural changes as a consequence of the
crisis and in order to limit the problem of endogeneity of the regressors. In order to
limit the loss of observations, we chose a different approach. Instead of excluding the
three time-series observations (i.e. 3 years) following a default, we include a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the country defaulted over the preceding 3 years
and 0 otherwise. In effect, given the way our dependent variable is defined (1 if the
                                                
25 One of three databases contained in EIU DataServices, a monthly publication by the
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London. This data was kindly provided by Credit Suisse
First Boston (Zurich).
26 Political Risk Services (PRS) Group, East Syracuse, New York.19
country defaulted in year t, t+1, or t+2 and 0 otherwise), this dummy is nothing else
than a lagged dependent variable with lag length equal to 3.
IV.     RESULTS
A.  Significance of Explanatory Variables and In-Sample Prediction Accuracy
 
  From the broad range of potentially relevant sovereign default indicators and
possible model specifications, we tried to find the specification where the
determinants were individually and jointly significant, had the expected sign, and
produced the best fit to the data. In particular, the best results were obtained with
definition 6 (see equation 13.6) of our dependent variable (see section III B), i.e.
where the probability of default over the 3 years between t and t+2 is modeled as a


















  For simplicity, the default probability ;,1,2 Prob(1) ittt d ++= will henceforth be
called DP. Table 4 summarizes the estimation results for three specifications, called




  For Model 1 (column 1 of table 4), the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic and the t-
statistics indicate that all explanatory variables are jointly and also individually
statistically significant. A comparison with the list in section III C confirms that all
determinants have the expected sign. As to the three explanatory variables that are
used for the first time in this study, the political risk indicator (POLRISK6) is
statistically one of the most significant variables; credit to the private sector/GDP
(CRPRIV) is significant at the 5% level; and our measure of real exchange rate
misalignment (DRER2HP) is also significant at the 5% level. The variable that turns
out to be most significant is the lagged dependent variable (L3DOREDT3ME), i.e. the
dummy variable that equals 1 if the country defaulted over the previous 3 years and is
0 otherwise. This result confirms the findings of earlier studies: state dependence
appears to be very important in the case of sovereign defaults, i.e. even after
controlling for other economic and political determinants, emerging market countries
that defaulted in the recent past are more likely to default in the future than non-
defaulting countries.
27 The second most significant determinant is the real 6-months
LIBOR (LIB6MRE1). Interestingly, only one of the surveyed studies (Lee (1991)) has
found this world factor – a measure of the cost of international credit – to be
significant.
 
  As explained in section III B, the parameters in column 1 are not the marginal
effects as the logit model is non-linear. Column 2 reports those marginal effects for
each explanatory variable. They are evaluated at the means of the explanatory
                                                
27See, for instance, McFadden et al. (1985), Hajivassiliou, V. (1989), Hajivassiliou, V. (1994).20
variables (see descriptive statistics in table 3), using equation (12).
28 A look at these
marginal impacts shows that the (re-)payment performance over the recent past
(L3DOREDT3ME) is not only the most significant determinant of sovereign default
in statistical terms but also in economic terms: the fact of having defaulted over the
past 3 years increases the probability of defaulting again over the next 3 years by fully
68.5%, compared to a situation without default over the past 3 years. The second most
important
29 determinant from an economic viewpoint is the real 6-months LIBOR rate
(LIB6MRE1): an increase of 100bp in the real 6-months LIBOR increases the default
probability of the average emerging market by over 9 percentage points. This value
seems quite high and would underscore the important role that conditions on
international capital markets play for emerging markets. It would also somewhat
qualify the view that emerging market debt defaults have purely “home made” roots.
Unfortunately, Lee (1991) – the only surveyed paper that found this measure of the
cost of foreign credit to be significant – does not calculate the marginal effects, so we
cannot compare the results.
 
  Two other very important determinants of sovereign default appear to be the
political risk indicator (POLRISK6) and the variability of real GNP-per-capita growth
(VGNPCAPG2), measured as the standard deviation of real GNP-per-capita growth
over the preceding 7 years. A one-unit increase in POLRISK6 (meaning a decrease in
political risk) reduces the default probability by 2.5% while a one-unit increase in
VGNPCAPG2 increases the probability of default by 2.7%. The debt-stock indicator
(LDEBST2) seems to be important too, its marginal effect being 3.7%. However, if
we break this indicator down into its two components – external debt as % of GNP
(LDGNP) and external debt as % of exports (LDEXP) – we realize that this is not
really the case: a one percentage point increase in LDGNP increases the default
probability by 0.04% while a similar increase in LDEXP increases the default
probability by a mere 0.01%. So contrary to a widely held belief, the debt levels
relative to the resource base (GNP or exports) per se do not appear to be very
important determinants of developing country default.
 
  The less important determinants are the current account-GDP ratio (?DP/
?CAGDPN = -1.6%), the amount of debt (re-)payment arrears relative to total debt
(?DP/?LARREDT = 1.5%) and the M2-international reserves ratio (?DP/?M2IR =
1.3%). The least important explanatory variables, eventually, appear to be the amount
of credit to the private sector relative to GDP (?DP/?CRPRIV = 0.39%), the inflation
rate in the economy (?DP/?CPIINF2 = 0.35%), and especially the percentage
deviation of the real exchange rate from long-run trend (?DP/?DRER2HP = 0.007%).
 
  However, the conclusion regarding the exchange rate misalignment measure
DRER2HP has to be qualified. The marginal effect of DRER2HP depends in a more
complex fashion on its initial level and on those of all the other variables in the model
                                                
28 As suggested by Greene (2000), p. 817, the marginal effect for the dummy
L3DOREDT3ME is calculated as
;,1,2*;,1,2* Prob(1,331) - Prob(1, itttittt dLDOREDTMEd ++++ === xx   330) LDOREDTME = ,
where  * x  denotes the means of all other explanatory variables.
29 The “economic” significance or importance of the determinants is judged by comparing the
sizes of the marginal effects in relation to the range (maximum-minimum, see descriptive
statistics in table 3) within which the values of these determinants vary in the sample.21
than is the case for the other determinants. In effect, equation (12) implies that – for
all variables entering the model linearly – all marginal effects change as the point of
evaluation of any determinant changes. The order of their economic importance,
however, does not depend on the evaluation point. Exactly this is not true for
DRER2HP because it enters the model squared. Its marginal effect depends on its






















  The net effect is that the marginal impact of DRER2HP increases as its point of
evaluation increases. For instance, at a real currency overvaluation of 40% (roughly
the situation of Argentina at the end of 2000 according to our measure) the marginal
impact of DRER2HP is 1.8% (compared to 0.007% before, i.e. about 250 times
larger!), all other determinants evaluated at their means. At this level of overvaluation,
DRER2HP is among the more important determinants, lying in between POLRISK6
(?DP/ ?POLRISK6 = 2.6%) and CAGDPN (?DP/?CAGDPN = 1.7%).
 
  As to the goodness of fit of Model 1, the McFadden R-squared (0.65) and
especially the “percent of correct classifications” (92.05%) indicate that it fits the data
very well. The latter statistic has the following interpretation. When we use the
estimated model parameters to calculate the associated default probabilities and
classify all countries for which the model predicts a default probability of 50% or
higher as defaults and all predicted probabilities that are lower as non-defaults, we
find that in 92.05% of all cases the model predicts the outcomes that have been
actually observed.
30 In terms of fit, Model 1 outperforms most studies surveyed in
table 1, with the exception of the models estimated by Aylward and Thorne (1998)
and Balkan (1992).
 
  However, it is especially the “percent of type I errors” (5.28%) that is
promisingly low – lower than the model with the lowest type I error in table 1. Type I
errors are classifications where countries actually defaulted but the model predicts a
default probability of less than 50% (“not predicted defaults”). Type II errors, instead,
are cases where countries have a predicted probability above 50% but did not default
in reality (“false alarms”). Model 1 yields 12.1% of type II errors. Considering that -
for international investors - the multiple costs resulting from a sovereign default are
likely to exceed the missed profits in a country that is expected to default but does not,
and given that there is always a trade-off between type I and type II errors (i.e.
minimizing type I errors increases type II errors, and vice-versa), we retained Model 1
out of several other specifications because it maximizes the percentage of correct
classifications while minimizing the percentage of type I errors.
 
                                                
 
30 The 50% threshold is somewhat arbitrary. We have chosen the 50% threshold because it is
the one that maximizes the percentage of correct classifications while minimizing type I and
type II errors.22
Model 2
  As there might be a bias problem as a result of the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable in a logit panel model, we also run a specification of the model
where the lagged dependent variable (L3DOREDT3ME) is excluded.
31 The results are
presented in columns 3 and 4 of table 4 (“Model 2”). As expected, the goodness of fit
diminishes (Percent correct classifications reduces to 84.63% from 92.05%) and the
size of a little more than half of the parameters changes considerably. However, with
the exception of the variable credit to the private sector as % of GDP (CRPRIV), all
determinants remain statistically significant. Moreover, the statistical significance of a
majority of the remaining determinants increases considerably. The variable that gains
most in statistical (and second most in economic) significance is the variability of real
GNP-per-capita growth (VGNPCAPG2). Moreover, measured by the size of the
marginal effect, VGNPCAPG2 is the most important variable in this specification: a
one-percentage point increase in the standard deviation of real GNP-per-capita growth
increaes the default probability by 5.6%. This seems to be a very interesting result if
we consider the fact that only Lee (1991) tested this variable before and found it
insignificant.
 
  The two other major statistical significance increases concern the indicator of
reserves adequacy (M2IR) and the one for the stock of total arrears relative to total
debt in the previous year (LARREDT). Indicators of the adequacy of international
reserves have been found to be very important in most previous studies. However, this
is the first sovereign default study that tests the M2-international reserves ratio and
finds it to be significant. The studies surveyed in table 1 all tested the reserves-imports
ratio or the reserves-external debt ratio and almost all found it to be significant. We
also started our analysis with the reserves-imports ratio, which was never significant
in any specification though.
 
  The stock of arrears gains most in both statistical and economic significance
presumably because it picks up part of the information contained in the lagged
dependent variable, which was another indicator of past repayment performance in
Model 1. All these differences with respect to the studies surveyed in table 1 might be
due to the different definition of the dependent variable. Recall that all previous
studies defined the dependent variable (“default” or “debt repayment difficulty”) in
terms of the level of arrears and reschedulings, while we defined it in terms of the
changes in these levels.
The variables whose parameters and marginal effects remain roughly the same
in size are the current account-GDP ratio (CAGDPN), the lagged debt stock indicator
(LDEBST2), CPI inflation (CPIINF) and, to a lesser extent, the M2-international
reserves ratio (M2IR), which decreases somewhat. On the other hand, the economic
significance of the real exchange rate misalignment variable (DRER2HP)^2, of the
political risk indicator (POLRISK6), and of the cost of international credit
(LIB6MRE1) reduces by about half.
                                                
 
31 For more details about the nature of this bias, see Heckman (1981) and Hajivassiliou, V.
(1994).23
Model 3
The default probabilities implied by Model 1 or Model 2 could now be used as
inputs in pricing decisions of sovereign bonds or loans or in credit risk management
models. But which of them is more appropriate? As past (re-)payment performance of
emerging markets has been found to be a very strong indicator of future (re-)payment
performance, we think that the information contained in the lagged dependent variable
(1 if the country defaulted at least once over the preceding three years, 0 otherwise) is
too valuable to be dropped. On the other hand, the significance of the variable “credit
to the private sector as a percentage of GDP” (CRPRIV) does not seem to be robust to
different specifications, given the results from Model 2. For these reasons a new
model – Model 3 (see columns 5 and 6 of table 4) – is specified where CRPRIV is
excluded but the lagged dependent variable (L3DOREDT3ME) is included.
As expected, the goodness-of-fit statistics of Model 3 (slightly) deteriorate
with respect to Model 1 (but improve compared to Model 2): the McFadden R-
squared diminishes from 0.65 to 0.64, and the “percent of correct classifications” from
92.05 to 91.71. However, this deterioration is marginal and only due to the increase in
the percent of type II errors from 12.10 to 13.12. In effect, the percent of type I errors
diminishes even slightly from 5.28 to 5.20. All indicators remain jointly significant
and, apart from the exchange rate misalignment variable (DRER2HP) that is now only
significant at the 6% confidence level, all indicators remain also individually
significant at the 5%, or even at the 1%, level. Moreover, comparing the size of the
coefficients and of the marginal effects of Model 3 with those of the original Model 1,
we observe that they are all broadly similar.
Thus, the conclusion drawn above (sub-section on Model 1) about the order of
importance of the determinants remains valid. By far the most important determinant
of sovereign default appears to be
•  The (re-)payment performance of a country over the recent past (a
dummy variable, L3DOREDT3ME, that takes on the value of 1 if the
country defaulted at least once over the preceding 3 years and is zero
otherwise). Its marginal effect is about 70%.
The other important determinants are
•  The cost of international credit (proxied by the real 6-months LIBOR,
LIB6MRE1), whose marginal effect is about 8%.
•  The variability of real GNP-per capita growth (measured as the standard
deviation of real GNP per capita growth over the preceding 7 years,
VGNPCAPG2) with a marginal effect of approximately 2.5%.
•  Political risks (measured by an index that incorporates the six sub-
components: quality of a country’s socio-economic conditions, quality of
its investment climate, the degree of corruption, degree of involvement of
the military in politics, degree of ethnic tensions, and degree of a
government’s democratic accountability). This index ranges from 0
(extremely high risk) to 48 (very low risk) and its marginal effect is about -
2%.
In the next section, we use the parameters of Model 3 to check its out-of-
sample prediction accuracy. In section IV C, eventually, we use Model 3 to calculate
the implied 3-years-ahead (cumulative) sovereign default probabilities and we24
compare them with the corresponding 3-year cumulative default rates that correspond
to Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s long-term foreign currency sovereign credit
ratings.
B.  Out-of-Sample Prediction Accuracy
Table 5 lists the 3-year (cumulative) default probabilities (DPs) calculated on
the basis of Model 3 for 87 emerging markets over the years 1990 to 2000. The un-
shaded area refers to the calculated in-sample DPs for the 78 countries used in the
estimation (Recall that the time-series dimension of the panel is 1984-97). For the
nine yellow shaded countries Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Slovenia, and Ukraine data was available only from 1998 on, so
only the out-of-sample DPs could be calculated for those ones. The yellow shaded
columns 1998, 1999, and 2000, finally, contain the calculated out-of-sample DPs for
all 87 countries.
The model yields, for instance, a DP for Ecuador in 1996 of 67.6%. This
means that with the information on the explanatory variables available as of 1996, the
probability of default by Ecuador in 1996 and/or 1997 and/or 1998 was 67.6%. The
default probability for 1997 (default in 1997, 1998 or 1999) increases to 83.8%.
As of mid-year 2001, we have got limited information available to “back-test”
Model 3 forecasts to actual outcomes. The model was estimated with data for the
period 1984-1997. From the most recent Global Development Finance 2001 on CD-
ROM (World Bank), we get actual arrears and rescheduling data for the years 1998
and 1999. The most recent EIU CountryData CD-ROM
32 (Economist Intelligence
Unit) provides us with estimates of arrears for the year 2000, and from our own
tracking of Paris and London Club rescheduling agreements, we obtain the countries
that rescheduled in 2000. Thus, the out-of-sample performance of Model 3 can be
tested by comparing the predicted 3-year default probabilities for 1997 with the actual
defaults in 1997, 1998, and 1999, and by comparing the predicted default probabilities
for 1998 with the actual defaults in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Tables 6 and 7 summarize
the results
1997 Out-of-Sample Forecasts (Table 6)
As explained in section IV A, we use the 50%-probability threshold to
distinguish defaults from non-default observations. The second column of table 6
corresponds to the column for 1997 of table 5. It reports the predicted default
probability in 1997, i.e. the probability that a country defaults in 1997, 1998, or 1999.
Column 3 of table 6 indicates whether a country effectively defaulted over this period
(=1) or not (=0). Similarly, column 6 marks the “false alarms”, i.e. the countries that
did not default over the three-year period but for which the model predicts a default
probability higher than 50%. Column 7 determines the other model error: the actual
defaults the model fails to identify. Column 8 indicates the correctly predicted
                                                
32 EIU Country Data (Update 34, July 2001) on CD-ROM.25
defaults, and the bottom of column 9, eventually, shows false alarms, not predicted
defaults and correct classifications in percentage terms.
The last row of table 6 shows that for the period 1997-1999, Model 3 manages
to predict 85.9% (67 out of 78) of defaults and non-defaults correctly. Five actual
defaults have not been predicted in 1997 (see dark shaded rows), implying 16.7% of
type I errors. These are Honduras (rescheduling in 1997 but DP is only 9.6%),
Indonesia (rescheduling in 1999 but DP only 6.1%), Kenya (increase in arrears in
1998 but DP only 8.2%), Pakistan (increase in arrears in 1998 and rescheduling in
1999 but DP only 8.6%) and Papua New Guinea (increase of arrears in 1999 but DP
only 8.3%).
At this point, a remark with respect to the Asian Crisis countries seems
warranted. According to column 3 of table 6, Indonesia is the only Asian Crisis
country having defaulted over the period 1997-1999. What about South Korea and
Thailand? South Korea (DP = 1.4%) did not have any arrears on long-term debt nor
did it reschedule any long-term debt over the period, according to Global
Development Finance on CD-ROM (1999, 2000, or 2001). Furthermore, neither
Moody’s Investors Service nor Standard and Poor’s, the rating agencies, classified
South Korea as in default in these three years.
33 However, digging a little deeper, one
finds that in January 1998 the government of South Korea reached a deal with
international banks to reschedule its short-term non-trade debt of US$ 24bn.
34 If we
also considered reschedulings of short-term debt in our default definition, the US$
24bn (equivalent to 17% of total external debt) would be far beyond the threshold of
2.4% of total external debt and, hence, South Korea would be classified as in default
in 1998. Moreover, considering the details of the deal,
35 one could legitimately assert
that if the rating agencies had strictly applied the second criterion
36 of their default
definition, they would have had to classify Korea as in default in 1998. As to Thailand
(DP = 2.8%), it turns out that it accumulated US$ 1.798bn of new principal arrears to
private creditors in 1998. This amount corresponds to about 1.7% of total external
debt, which means that the default threshold of 1.9% is slightly missed. Eventually,
both South Korea and Thailand would certainly have defaulted had they not benefited
from large-scale IMF bailout packages.
If we thus considered South Korea (DP = 1.4%) and Thailand (DP = 2.8%) as
having defaulted in 1998, we would obtain two more type I errors. Hence, the percent
of correct predictions would diminish to 83.3 from 85.9 and the percent of type I
errors would increase to 21.9 from 16.7. Generally, the failure of all three models to
predict the Indonesian default and the Thai and South Korean quasi-defaults reflects
the problem that these crises could not be foreseen on the basis of any fundamental
analysis. To our knowledge, there is currently no model available that is able to
predict these crises ex ante. This evidence supports the view that the Asian crises have
been of a “self-fulfilling” nature.
                                                
33 Moody's Investors Service (1999a), p. 41, and Standard & Poor's (1999b), p. 17.
34 Financial Times (1998), and World Bank (2000), p. 620.
35According to the Financial Times (1998), „[the deal] set interest rates at 225, 250 and 275
basis points over the six-month LIBOR… Banks had initially pressed for a 400 basis point
rate.”
36 See section III A.26
The reason for the six (i.e. 12.5%) “false alarms” Brazil (DP = 80.1%),
Guatemala (DP = 86.7%), Jamaica (81.8%), Panama (DP = 81.0%), Poland (DP =
61.2%), and Sri Lanka (DP = 79.0%) is always the same: the weight of past
repayment performance (L3DOREDT3ME). They all defaulted at least once over the
preceding three years (i.e. 1994-1996) but then became “good” debtors over the
period under consideration.
1998 Out-of-Sample Forecasts (Table 7)
Table 7 is analogous to table 6 except that it tests the out-of-sample
performance of Model 3 for the forecast period 1998-2000 and for the nine additional
countries mentioned above, i.e. for 87 emerging markets on the whole.
37 The last row
shows that in this case, Model 3 predicts 86.2% (75 out of 87) of defaults and non-
defaults correctly – a performance which is roughly the same as before. There are also
five type I errors (16.1%) of which three (Kenya, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea) are
the same as before. The two other not-predicted defaults are those of Kazakhstan
(significant increase in arrears in 1999 but DP in 1998 of only 7.4%) and Zimbabwe
(new arrears in 2000 but DP in 1998 of “only” 15.2%). Note than none of these type I
errors concern the nine additional countries included in this out-of-sample test.
Indonesia’s 1999 default (rescheduling) is predicted this time, the default
probability in 1998 being 95%. A quick look at the determinants reveals an interesting
result. The main determinant responsible for this high DP is our exchange rate
misalignment variable (DRER2HP), indicating that – due to the dramatic devaluation
of the Indonesian Rupiah in 1998 – the Indonesian currency was about 64%
undervalued in that year. Recall the discussion of equation (14) in section IV A. At
such a serious level of misalignment, DRER2HP becomes a very important
determinant of the sovereign default probability because it enters (the already non-
linear!) equation (9’’) squared. Hence, it is also the reduction of this undervaluation to
about 3% in 1999, which explains the sharp fall in the DP in 1999 to 10.9% (see table
5).
The third-last row of table 7 shows that the 1998 DP forecasts produce exactly
the same percentage of type II errors as the 1997 DP forecasts, namely 12.5%. In
absolute terms, this is one more false alarm compared to the six ones in table 6. Two
of them are the same as before (Jamaica and Sri Lanka). The five new false alarms
pertain to Algeria (DP = 81.5%), Bulgaria (DP = 73.6%), Croatia (DP = 88.8%),
Dominican Republic (DP = 75.9%), and Peru (DP = 84.8%). The reason for these
false alarms is the same again: the countries defaulted (at least once) over the three
years 1995 to 1997 but then serviced their debts according to schedule over the period
1998-2000. Note that out of the nine “out-of-sample countries”, the misclassification
of Croatia is the only type II error affecting those countries. Finally, as far as South
Korea (DP = 1.5%) and Thailand (DP = 2.4%) are concerned, the same remarks as in
the preceding section apply (i.e. if we taxed them as defaults in 1998, we would have
two more type I errors, which would reduce the percentage of correct classifications
to 83.9 from 86.2; the percent of type I errors would increase to 21.2 from 16.1).
                                                
37 The nine additional countries are the yellow shaded ones of table 5, i.e. Azerbaijan, Croatia,
Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Slovenia, and Ukraine.27
On the basis of two years of out-of-sample forecasts for 78 countries in the
first exercise and 87 in the second, we conclude that the out-of-sample prediction
accuracy of Model 3 is surprisingly good: the percent of correct classifications is 86.1
on average, compared to an in-sample performance of 91.7%. The percent of type I
errors out-of-sample is 16.4 on average, compared to 5.2% in-sample. Finally, we
have an average of only 12.5% of type II errors out-of-sample, which even beats the
13.1% of type II errors in-sample. Unfortunately, we cannot compare these
performance rates to the empirical studies surveyed in section II and table 1 as none of
them performs out-of-sample performance tests.
C.  Comparison of Estimated Default Probabilities vs. Rating Agencies’ Default
Rates
Sovereign Credit Ratings and Corresponding Default Rates
The default probabilities calculated from Model 3 and summarized in table 5
(i.e. the probabilities that emerging market countries default within a three-year
horizon on their foreign currency denominated debt) can now be compared indirectly
with the information conveyed by the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit
ratings that are publicly available on the websites of the two leading rating agencies,
Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s) and Standard and Poor’s (“S&P’s”).
38
According to S&P’s, long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings “are an
assessment of each government’s capacity and willingness to repay [foreign currency
denominated, long-term] debt according to its terms”.
39 Moody’s broadly similar
rating concept, called “country ceiling for long-term foreign currency bonds and
notes”, is “based upon the default risk for medium and/or long-term debt obligations
issued by a national government (denominated in foreign currency)”.
40
How can Model 3 default probabilities be compared to these letter ratings,
ranging from triple-A (i.e. Aaa for Moody’s, AAA for S&P’s) all the way down to
single-C? It is not to those letter ratings directly that the calculated default
probabilities can be compared, but they can be compared to the 3-year cumulative
default rates associated with each rating grade.
Table 8 presents Moody’s and S&P’s rating scales along with the associated 3-
year cumulative default rates. Both rating agencies compile such cumulative default
rates over periods of one up to 20 years.
41 For example, the average 3-year cumulative
                                                
38 For Moody’s Investors Service’s country (formerly “sovereign”) ceilings, see
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/RatingAction/rlist.asp?busLineId=7.
For Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings, see
http://www.standardandpoors.com/RatingsActions/RatingsLists/Sovereigns/SovereignsRatingsList.html.
Alternatively, a third globally operating commercial provider of credit ratings is FitchIBCA,
see http://www.fitchibca.com/corporate/sectors/issuers_list_corp.cfm?sector_flag=5&marketsector=1&detail=.
39 See Standard & Poor's (1997), p. 21.
40 See Moody's Investors Service (1995), p. 5.
41 See, for instance, Standard & Poor's (2001a) and Moody's Investors Service (2001).28
default rate for the rating grade BB+ (S&P’s) equals 3.15%. That is the historical
average number of obligors that defaulted within the three years of being assigned the
rating BB+, expressed as a percentage of the total number of companies with a BB+
rating over the same three years.
All major banks use credit ratings and, especially, the corresponding default
rates to price bonds and loans, to feed their credit risk management models, and to
determine their complex customer and country exposure limits. Moreover, according
to the current version of the New Basel Capital Accord
42, banks will be allowed to use
credit ratings and the corresponding default rates to determine the amount of
regulatory capital they have to set aside against their credit risks. Thus, credit ratings
and associated default rates play a crucial role in international capital allocation.
The central problem for emerging market sovereign credit analysis is that
these are corporate default rates, i.e. based on rated companies that have defaulted in
the past. There are no reliable default rates available for sovereign borrowers. The
reason is that only very few rated sovereigns have defaulted since World War II when
the rating agencies started to collect the relevant data.
43 In other words, it is not that
few sovereigns have defaulted since World War II – proof of which is figure 1 – but
that the governments which defaulted (mostly low income/less developed countries)
were not rated by the rating agencies and, vice-versa, that those governments which
had a rating assigned by either Moody’s and/or S&P’s (mostly high-
income/industrialized countries) did not default.
44 Thus, not only is the population of
potentially “ratable” sovereigns small (around 200) compared to that of companies
(tens if not hundreds of thousands), but also the sample of rated sovereigns is not
representative. As a consequence, default rates for sovereign rating grades are
unreliable. In effect, most of them are (still) zero!
For want of better alternatives, it is thus common practice among bank credit
risk managers to assume that corporate and sovereign default rates are similar or, as
one of the rating agencies puts it: “Standard & Poor’s expects sovereign rating
stability and default probability to converge with its corporate ratios over time as the
number of sovereign observations increases, as one would expect given that both
groups use the same rating definitions.”
45 However, given the fundamentally different
                                                
42 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001).
43 Since World War II (and until December 2001), only five governments rated by S&P’s
have defaulted on long-term (local and foreign currency, bond and bank) debt: Venezuela
(1983-90, 1995-1998), Indonesia (1998-2000), Pakistan (1998-1999), Russia (1998-2000),
and Argentina (2001) (Standard & Poor's (2001b), p. 89, and author’s own tracking). During
the same period, eight sovereigns rated by Moody’s have defaulted on publicly held long-term
(local and foreign currency) debt: Argentina (1989), Pakistan (1998), Russia (1998),
Venezuela (1998), Ecuador (1999), Ukraine (2000), Peru (2000), and Argentina (2001)
(Moody's Investors Service (1999a), p. 6, and author’s own tracking).
44 Moreover, it appears that when rated sovereigns default, they default first on un-rated debt.
Only if there are no alternatives, they default on rated, publicly traded (bond) debt. However,
default rate statistics take account of a sovereign’s ability to “selectively default” by focusing
on “issuer” ratings and not on “issue” ratings. For more information about rating definitions
and methodologies, see rating agencies’ websites.
45 Standard & Poor's (2001b), p. 89.29
legal status of sovereign and corporate borrowers, and the fundamental difference
between sovereign and corporate “solvency”, this assumption seems more than
doubtful.
The question therefore is: could sovereign default probabilities such as those
derived in the present paper (see table 5) be more appropriate measures of the
likelihood of a sovereign default than rating agencies’ corporate default rates? This
question is not easily answered. For the time being, let’s assume they are and proceed
to the comparison of the two sets of default risk measures. Tables 9 and 10 list Model
3 default probabilities (DPs) along with Moody’s and S&P’s “average 3-year
cumulative default rates by letter rating” (DRs) for two sets of countries at two
moments in time:
1)  Table 9 shows Model 3 DPs and agencies’ DRs at the end of 1996 (i.e.
the last observations available before the outbreak of the Asian crisis)
for those 40 countries for which Model 3 DPs could be calculated and
which were rated at that time by either Moody’s or S&P’s.
46
2)  Table 10 displays Model 3 DPs and agencies’ DRs at the end of 2000
for those 25 emerging markets that had the largest liabilities (in US$
terms) towards BIS reporting banks in 2000.
47
Before the Asian Crisis (Table 9)
Table 9 shows the situation for the 40 countries rated by either Moody’s or
S&P’s before the outbreak of the Asian crisis, i.e. at the end of 1996 (or the beginning
of 1997). Of the 29 countries rated by both Moody’s and S&P’s, 79% (i.e. 23) had
lower 3-year cumulative default rates than estimated 3-year sovereign default
probabilities. Moody’s had rated 37 of those 40 countries at the time (i.e. 93%). 30 of
these 37 sovereigns (i.e. 81%) had default rates that were lower than Model 3 DPs.
Standard & Poor’s had assigned sovereign credit ratings to 32 (i.e. 80%) of them.
Their default rates, however, were lower than Model 3 DPs for 84% of the countries
rated (27 out of 32). For only three of the 40 countries – Mexico, Romania, and
Venezuela – Model 3 DPs lie somewhere in between Moody’s and S&P’s default
rates.
The results are particularly interesting for the Asian crisis countries Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand as well as for Russia (grey shaded countries). For all
these countries, the default rates implied by their ratings at the end of 1996 seem
overly optimistic. For Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, Model 3 default probabilities at
the end of 1996 were about 4 to 5 times higher than Moody’s default rates and about 8
to 11 times higher than S&P’s default rates. For Russia, the calculated DP was about
15 times higher than S&P’s default rate and almost 20 times higher than Moody’s
default rate. Thailand’s Model 3 DP was almost 26 times higher than both Moody’s
                                                
46 Model 3 DPs can be calculated in 1996 for 77 of the 78 countries (except for South Africa).
47 To calculate the default probabilities as of end 2000, estimates from EIU CountryData
(Update 28, January 2001) on CD-ROM were used for all indicators except for debt
rescheduling arrangements. Data on the latter was taken from the Institute of International
Finance’s “Survey of Debt Restructuring by Private Creditors” and “Survey of Debt
Restructurings by Official Creditors”.30
and S&P’s default rate. To be fair, though, one has to acknowledge that in absolute
terms, Model 3 default probabilities were also relatively low for all four Asian Crisis
countries. However, Russia’s sovereign default probability was very high at the end of
1996 (99.7%). This result is mainly due to the fact that Russia had defaulted on
external debt in almost every year since 1990.
At the Beginning of 2001 (Table 10)
Table 10 makes a similar assessment but this time for the 25 emerging market
countries with the largest liabilities to foreign banks in 2000. More generally, these
are also the emerging markets that have received the most foreign capital flows of any
form in recent years. The rationale for the choice of this sample is that sovereign
credit ratings – and the associated estimates of credit risk – play their potentially most
important role in the international allocation of bank finance and portfolio debt (i.e.
sovereign and corporate bonds) flows. The fact that bank debt has been shown to be
the most volatile form of foreign finance in emerging markets in recent years,
48 may
very well be related to the way international banks rate emerging market sovereigns.
Similarly, the large rating downgrades of Asian sovereigns by Moody’s and S&P’s
during the Asian Crisis (the so-called “rating crisis”, see Jüttner and McCarthy
(2000)) may help explain the volatility of portfolio debt flows in recent years.
24 of the 25 emerging markets in table 10 are rated by both Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s. Saudi Arabia is only rated by Moody’s. Compared to the situation
before the Asian crisis, the picture is somewhat less extreme for Moody’s but even
more pronounced for S&P’s. Moody’s default rates are lower than Model 3 DPs for
76% of the countries (19 out of 25), i.e. for all except Brazil, India, the Philippines,
Turkey, and Venezuela. S&P’s default rates are lower for fully 22 of the 24 rated
countries (i.e. 92%), i.e. for all except the Philippines and Venezuela. For only two of
the 24 largest bank debtor nations rated by both S&P’s and Moody’s (i.e. 8%) – the
Philippines and Venezuela – Model 3 sovereign default probabilities are lower than
both agencies’ default rates. Again three countries – Brazil, India, and Turkey this
time – have predicted DPs that are in-between Moody’s and S&P’s default rates. This
implies that – again as before! – 79% of the countries rated by both rating agencies
(19 out of 24) had 3-year cumulative default rates that were lower than the 3-year
default probabilities estimated by Model 3.
Argentina might be an interesting case in the light of its recent default
(November 2001). The predicted 3-year DP at the beginning of 2001 (i.e. with data on
the determinants available as of end 2000) was 18.15%. This means that Model 3 did
not predict the Argentine default one year ahead. However, compared to the default
rates implied by Moody’s and S&P’s long-term FX ratings (14.81% and 6.79%), the
outlook conveyed by Model 3 DPs was clearly more pessimistic. Turkey is another
important emerging market that gives rise to concern among international financial
market participants at the moment. Here, the results are more in line with each other.
The Model 3 default probability forecast for the period 2000-2002 is about 14.4%,
which is slightly smaller than the 14.8% 3-year cumulative default rate implied by
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Moody’s B1 rating, but somewhat larger than the 10.4% 3-year default rate implied
by S&P’s B+ rating.
The conclusions from this comparison are drawn in the next section (see sub-
section entitled Adequacy of rating agencies’ “sovereign” default rates).
V.     CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The paper made an attempt at estimating sovereign default probabilities with a
logit panel model, using data for 78 emerging markets over the period 1984-1997. In
contrast with the existing literature, the dependent variable (“sovereign default”) is
defined with respect to the changes in the levels of debt arrears and amounts of debt
rescheduled as compared to the levels themselves. Compared to the existing studies,
the estimated models fit the data equally well or better, achieving an average in-
sample prediction accuracy of about 91%, with slightly over 5% type I errors and
about 13% of type II errors. The out-of-sample performance is also quite promising:
the percentage of correct classifications is 86% with about 16.5% type I errors and
12.5% type II errors. The paper provides new empirical evidence about the
importance of international and country-specific macroeconomic and political
determinants of sovereign default. It then compares the estimated sovereign default
probabilities with the default rates correspond-ding to the sovereign credit ratings of
the two leading rating agencies, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s.
The results obtained from the analysis of our sample suggest conclusions in three
main areas: (1) with respect to the determinants of sovereign default, (2) with respect
to the adequacy of rating agencies “sovereign” default rates and, (3) with respect to
questions requiring further research.
Sovereign default determinants
By far the most important country-specific explanatory variable appears to be
the repayment performance of a country over the recent past: a sovereign that
defaulted (at least once) over the preceding three years has a default probability that is
fully 70 percentage points higher than a sovereign with an unblemished debt-servicing
track record over the same period. The two most important other country-specific
determinants are the variability of real GNP-per capita growth and a political risk
index – both variables that have either not been used in previous studies or were found
to be insignificant: a 100 bp-increase in the volatility of the real GNP-per capita
growth rate increases the default probability by about 250 bp, while a one-unit
increase in political risk increases default risk by 200 bp.
49 The other significant
determinants – in decreasing order of importance – are: the percentage deviation of
the real exchange rate from long-run trend, the current account/GDP ratio, the amount
of arrears accumulated in the previous year, the M2/interntional reserves ratio, the
CPI inflation rate, and a debt stock indicator (comprised of the debt/GDP and the
debt/exports ratio).
Emerging market economies wishing to have access to international capital
markets have an interest in minimizing their default probability. Failing to do so
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implies that they are confronted with severe borrowing restrictions
50 or unsustainably
high borrowing costs (the other side of the same coin). The results thus suggest that
the typical emerging market government has an interest (in that order of importance):
•  to keep a good track record as a borrower, i.e. not to default on external
obligations and, in case a default is inevitable, to keep amounts of
defaulted obligations as low as possible
•  to try to limit fluctuations in the growth rate of per capita income
•  to limit political risks in the country, in particular
￿  to limit corruption, ethnic tensions, and the involvement of the
army in politics and
￿  to improve the investment climate, socio-economic conditions, and
the government’s democratic accountability.
•  to implement proper exchange rate policies by avoiding large deviations of
the real exchange rate from long-run trend
•  to limit the speed with which it accumulates external liabilities (i.e. to limit
the size of its current account deficit compared to its GDP)
•  to keep a certain cushion of international reserves relative to the money
supply (This seems to be especially relevant for countries with a relatively
open capital account, an unstable money demand or a weak banking
system, where the potential for capital flight is high.
51)
•  to maintain price stability by means of appropriate fiscal and monetary
policies, and
•  to limit the size of its external debt stock compared to its total income
(GNP) and its export earnings.
In contrast to the existing literature, we also find that the cost of international
credit – a global factor – is a very important default determinant: a one-percentage
point increase in the real 6-month LIBOR rate increases the default probability of the
average emerging market sovereign by about 800 basis points.
Adequacy of rating agencies’ “sovereign” default rates
We compared the rating agencies’ corporate default rates (which agencies use
as proxies for the non-existing sovereign default rates) that are associated with each
rating grade with the estimated sovereign default probabilities at two (arbitrary) points
in time: at the end of 1996 (i.e. before the Asian Crisis) and at the end of 2000. The
comparison showed that in both years, 79% of the countries rated by both agencies
had substantially lower 3-year default rates than estimated 3-year default probabilities.
Moreover, in the sample analyzed, S&P’s default rates were lower on average than
Moody’s default rates.
These results suggest the following conclusions. First, on an empirical level, it
appears that rating agencies’ (corporate!) default rates considerably underestimate
(sovereign!) default risk over a three-year horizon. This finding is consistent with the
observation that bonds issued by emerging market sovereigns usually trade at higher
yield spreads than similarly rated US corporate bonds (see, e.g., International
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51 See International Monetary Fund (2000a), p. 14.33
Monetary Fund (2000b)). This differential in yield spreads could thus be explained by
the higher default probability of emerging market sovereigns (as opposed to a greater
loss-given-default rate) compared to US corporates. Another way of interpreting the
results from the comparison is that rating agencies’ sovereign ratings are generally too
high. If the results based on this sample turned out to be representative, both
interpretations would imply that the corporate default rates associated with a given
(corporate) rating grade do not appear to be adequate proxies for the sovereign default
probabilities associated with the same (sovereign) rating grade. Further research is
needed to assess whether the leading market providers of sovereign credit ratings
systematically underestimate sovereign default risk.
Second, on a more theoretical level, a systematic underestimation of sovereign
default risk in emerging markets by rating agencies, internationally operating banks
and other international investors would lead (or could have led) to an underestimation
of credit risk, hence to an under-pricing of foreign finance and, hence, to excessive
foreign (bank and portfolio debt) capital inflows in these markets. Subsequently, when
some unexpected global or country specific shock (e.g. an unexpected policy shift –
such as a no-bailout, a devaluation or a default –, an increase in political instability, or
the bursting of a domestic asset price bubble) triggers a reassessment of the effective
(market and credit) risks involved, internal and external ratings
52 may be rapidly
downgraded and foreign (short-term) finance flows out as international investors
struggle to reduce their exposures in these countries now perceived to be more risky.
Moreover, a vicious circle of internal and external rating downgrades, capital outflows
and deteriorating expected fundamentals may develop, resulting in a self-fulfilling
crisis. The liquidity crisis that follows the harum-scarum capital outflows may
eventually lead to a full-blown financial (i.e. balance-of-payments and/or currency
and/or debt and/or banking) crisis, which in turn is likely to result in the serious
welfare losses documented in chapter 7 of Goldstein et al. (2000) and, more recently,
in Hutchison and Neuberger (2001). In the light of these potential consequences, an
appropriate assessment of sovereign default risk by rating agencies and international
investors appears crucial.
Agenda for future research
Two issues are further investigated. First, I plan to relax the simplifying
assumption of equation errors being identically and independently distributed across
time and across countries in order to verify if the conclusions drawn are robust to this
kind of specification change. Relaxing this assumption necessitates proper dealing
with possible state dependence within a cross-sectional unit, and unobserved
heterogeneity across units. Unfortunately, estimating such dynamic discrete choice
models is not an easy task. However, with the recent publication of the work by
Honore and Kyriazidou (2000), this task appears to be feasible now.
Second, I plan to examine a little more in depth what the rating agencies’
sovereign (long-term, foreign currency) credit ratings really measure. Beyond the
classic reference in this field, Cantor and Packer (1996), there are unfortunately only
few more recent empirical papers on this issue.
53 Unfortunately, too, their conclusions
                                                
52 “Internal” refers to bank-internal ratings, while “external” refers to agency ratings.
53 See, for instance, Jüttner and McCarthy (2000), Monfort and Mulder (2000), and Mulder
and Perrelli (2001).34
are not uniform as they use very different samples. Moreover, contrary to their results,
our own preliminary investigations
54 (using a maximum of countries rated, not only
some 20 emerging markets) show that one of the most important driving factors of
sovereign credit ratings appear to be PPP adjusted GDP per capita levels – a
somewhat puzzling result, at least at first sight. Is it possible that, at the end of the
day, the rating agencies’ sovereign credit ratings simply reflect standards of living or
levels of development?
                                                
54 See Peter (2002).35
VI.     REFERENCES
Arellano, Manuel, and Bo Honore, 2001, "Panel Data Models: Some Recent
Developments," in Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5, ed. by James J. Heckman
and Edward Leamer (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Arora, Vivek B., 1993, "Sovereign Debt: A Survey of Some Theoretical and Policy
Issues," IMF Working Paper N°56 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Avery, Robert B., and Eric O'N Fisher, 1992, "Empirical models of debt-rescheduling
with sovereign immunity," in Country Risk Analysis. A Handbook, ed. by
Ronald L. Solberg (London: Routledge), pp. 100-117.
Avramovic, Dragoslav, 1964, Economic Growth and External Debt (Baltimore,
Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press).
Aylward, Lynn, and Rupert Thorne, 1998, "An Econometric Analysis of Countries'
Repayment Performance to the International Monetary Fund," IMF Working
Paper N°32 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Babbel, David F., 1996, "Insuring Sovereign Debt Against Default," World Bank
Discussion Paper N°328 (Washington: The World Bank).
Balkan, Erol, 1992, "Political Instability, Country Risk and Probability of Default,"
Applied Economics, Vol. 24 (9), pp. 999-1008.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001, "The New Basel Capital Accord,"
Consultative Document, January (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).
Beim, David O., and Charles W. Calomiris, 2001, Emerging Financial Markets (New
York: McGraw-Hill/Irvin).
Berg, Andrew, and Catherine Pattillo, 1998, "Are Currency Crises Predictable? A Test,"
IMF Working Paper N° 154 (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
Berg, Andrew, and Jeffrey Sachs, 1988, "The Debt Crisis: Structural Explanations of
Country Performance," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 271-
306.
Callier, Philippe, 1985, "Further results on countries' debt-service performance: The
relevance of structural factors," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 121, pp. 105-
115.
Calvo, Guillermo A, 1996, "Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Management: Tequila
Lessons," International Jouranal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 1 (July), pp.
207-224.
Calvo, Guillermo A, and Enrique G Mendoza, 1996, "Mexico's balance of payments
crisis: a chronicle of a death foretold," Journal of International Economics, Vol.
41, pp. 235-264.
Cantor, Richard, and Frank Packer, 1996, "Determinants and Impact of Sovereign
Credit Ratings," FRBNY Economic Policy Review, Vol. (October), pp. 37-52.
Ciarrapico, Anna Micaela, 1992, Country Risk: A Theoretical Framework of Analysis
(Aldershot: Dartmouth).
Citron, Joel-Tomas, and Gerald Nickelsburg, 1987, "Country Risk and Political
Instability," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 385-392.
Cline, William, 1984, International debt: Systemic risk and policy response
(Washington D.C.: Institute of International Economics).
Cline, William R., 1995, International Debt Reexamined (Washington D.C.: Institute
for International Economics).
Cohen, Daniel, 1991, Private Lending to Sovereign States: A Theoretical Autopsy
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).36
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini, 1998, "Fundamental
Determinants of the Asian Crisis: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment,"
Unpublished manuscript (New Haven, New York, New York: Yale University
and University of Bologna, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and NBER,
New York University and NBER).
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica Detragiache, 1998, "The Determinants of Banking
Crises in Developing Countries," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45 (1), pp. 81-109.
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica Detragiache, 1999, "Monitoring Banking Sector
Fragility: A Multivariate Logit Approach," IMF Working Paper N° 147
(Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Detragiache, Enrica, and Antonio Spilimbergo, 2000, "Crises and Liquidity: Evidence
and Interpretation," Unpublished manuscript (Washington: International
Monetary Fund).
Eaton, Jonathan, and Raquel Fernandez, 1995, "Sovereign Debt," in Handbook of
International Economics, Vol. III, ed. by Gene Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff
(Amsterdam: Elsevier), pp. 2031-2077.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Marc Gersovitz, 1981, "Debt with potential repudiation:
Theoretical and empirical analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 48
(February), pp. 289-309.
Eaton, Jonathan, Mark Gersowitz, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986, "The Pure Theory of
Country Risk," European Economic Review, Vol. 30 (June), pp. 481-513.
Edwards, Sebastian, 1984, "LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical
Investigation, 1976-80," American Economic Review, Vol. 74 (4), pp. 726-734.
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew Rose, and Charles Wyplosz, 1996, "Contagious Currency
Crises," Scandinavian Economic Review, Vol. 98 (4), pp. 463-484.
Feder, Gershon, and Richard E. Just, 1977, "A Study of Debt Servicing Capacity
Applying Logit Analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 25-
38.
Feder, Gershon, Richard E. Just, and Knud Ross, 1981, "Projecting debt-servicing
capacity of developing countries," Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, Vol. 16 (5), pp. 651-669.
Feder, Gershon, and Lily V. Uy, 1985, "The Determinants of International
Creditworthiness and Their Policy Implications," Journal of Policy Modeling,
Vol. 7 (1), pp. 133-156.
Financial Times, 1998, Crisis Countdown - Korea: May 1997 to July 1998 (in:
Financial Times Special Report: Asia in Crisis)
(http://specials.ft.com/ln/specials98/q2ada.htm).
Frank, Charles Raphael, and William R Cline, 1971, "Measurement of debt servicing
capacity of developing countries: An application of discriminant analysis,"
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 1, pp. 327-344.
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and Andrew K. Rose, 1996, "Currency Crashes in Emerging
Markets: An Empirical Treatment," Journal of International Economics, Vol.
41, pp. 351-366.
Goldfajn, Ilan, and Rodrigo O. Valdes, 1997, "Are Currency Crises Predictable?," IMF
Working Paper N° 159 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Goldstein, Morris, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Graciela L. Kaminsky, 2000, Assessing
Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for Emerging Markets
(Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics).
Greene, William H., 2000, Econometric Analysis (Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice
Hall, 4th ed.).37
Hajivassiliou, Vassilis, 1989, "Do the Secondary Markets Believe in Life After Debt?,"
World Bank Policy Planning and Research Working Paper N° 252 (Washington:
The World Bank).
Hajivassiliou, Vassilis, 1994, "A Simulation Estimation Analysis of the External Debt
Crises of Developing Countries," Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 9 (2),
pp. 109-113.
Hajivassiliou, Vassilis A, 1987, "The External Debt Repayment Problems of LDC's: An
Econometric Model Based on Panel Data," Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 36,
pp. 205-230.
Haque, Nadeem U., Nelson Mark, and Donald J. Mathieson, 1998, "The Relative
Importance of Political and Economic Variables in Creditworthiness Ratings,"
IMF Working Paper N°46 (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
Haque, Nadeem Ul, Manmohan S. Kumar, Nelson Mark, and Donald J. Mathieson,
1996, "The Economic Content of Indicators of Developing Country
Creditworthiness," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 43 (4), pp. 688-724.
Heckman, James J, 1981, "Statistical Models for Discrete Panel Data," in Structural
Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, ed. by Charles
Manski and Daniel McFadden (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 114-178.
Honohan, Patrick, 1997, "Banking System Failures in Developing and Transition
Countries: Diagnosis and Prediction," BIS Working Papers N°39 (Basle: Bank
for International Settlements).
Honore, Bo E, and Ekaterini Kyriazidou, 2000, "Panel Data Discrete Choice Models
with Lagged Dependent Variables," Econometrica, Vol. 68 (4), pp. 839-874.
Hutchison, Michael M., and Ilan Neuberger, 2001, "Output Costs of Currency and
Balance of Payments Crises in Emerging Markets," Unpublished manuscript
(Santa Cruz: University of California, Santa Cruz, September).
International Monetary Fund, 1998, International Capital Markets - Developments,
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (Washington D.C.: International Monetary
Fund).
International Monetary Fund, 2000a, "Debt- and Reserve-Related Indicators of External
Vulnerability," Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department in
consultation with other Departments, March 23 (Washington D.C.: International
Monetary Fund).
International Monetary Fund, 2000b, "Emerging Market Financing - Quarterly Report
on Developments and Prospects," Third Quarter 2000 (Washington D.C.:
International Monetary Fund).
International Monetary Fund, 2001, Anticipating Crises: Model Behavior or
Stampeding Herds (Transcript of an Economic Forum, November 1st)
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2001/tr011101a.htm).
Jüttner, D. Johannes, and Justin McCarthy, 2000, "Modelling a Rating Crisis,"
Unpublished manuscript (Sydney: Macquarie University).
Kaminsky, Graciela L., 1998, "Currency and Banking Crises: A Composite Leading
Indicator," Unpublished manuscript (Washington: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System).
Kaminsky, Graciela L., Saul Lizondo, and Carmen M. Reinhart, 1997, "Leading
Indicators of Currency Crises," IMF Working Paper N° 79 (Washington:
International Monetary Fund).
Kaminsky, Graciela L., and Carmen M. Reinhart, 1999, "The Twin Crises: The Causes
of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems," American Economic Review,
Vol. 3 (89), pp. 473-500.38
Lee, Suk Hun, 1991, "Ability and willingness to service debt as explanation for
commercial and official rescheduling cases," Journal of Banking and Finance,
Vol. 15, pp. 5-27.
Lee, Suk Hun, 1993, "Are the credit ratings assigned by bankers based on the
willingness of LDC borrowers to repay?," Journal of Development Economics,
Vol. 40, pp. 349-359.
Li, Carmen A., 1992, "Debt Arrears in Latin America: Do Political Variables Matter?,"
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 28 (4), pp. 668-688.
Maddala, G. S., 1983, Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Marashaden, Omar, 1997, "A Logit Model to Predict Debt Rescheduling by Less
Developed Countries," Asian Economies, Vol. 26 (March), pp. 25-34.
McDonald, Donogh, 1982, "Debt Capacity and Developing Country Borrowing: A
Survey of the Literature," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 29, pp. 603-646.
McFadden, Daniel, Richard Eckaus, Gershon Feder, Vassilis Hajivassiliou, and Stephen
O'Connell, 1985, "Is There Life After Debt? An Econometric Analysis of the
Creditworthiness of Developing Countries," in International Debt and the
Developing Countries, ed. by Gordon Smith and John Cuddington (Washington
D.C.: The World Bank), pp. 179-209.
Monfort, Brieuc, and Christian Mulder, 2000, "Using Credit Ratings for Capital
Requirements on Lending to Emerging Market Economies: Possible Impact of a
New Basel Capital Accord," IMF Working Paper N° 69 (Washington D.C.:
International Monetary Fund).
Moody's Investors Service, 1995, "Sovereign Risk: Bank Deposits vs. Bonds," Special
Comment, October (New York: Moody's Investors Service).
Moody's Investors Service, 1999a, "Historical Default Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers,
1920-1998," Special Comment, January (New York: Moody's Investors
Service).
Moody's Investors Service, 1999b, "Moody's Sovereign Ratings: A Ratings Guide,"
Special Comment, March (New York: Moody's Investors Service).
Moody's Investors Service, 2000, "Historical Default Rates of Corporate Bond Issuers,
1920-1999," Special Comment, January (New York: Moody's Investors
Service).
Moody's Investors Service, 2001, "Default and Recovery Rates of Corporate Bond
Issuers: 2000," Special Comment, February (New York: Moody's Investors
Service).
Mulder, Christian, and Roberto Perrelli, 2001, "Foreign Currency Credit Ratings for
Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Paper N° 191 (Washington D.C.:
International Monetary Fund).
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff, 1996, "Chap. 6: Imperfections in International
Capital Markets," in Foundations of International Macroeconomics,
(Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press), pp. 349-428.
Odedokun, M.O., 1995, "Analysis of probability of external debt rescheduling in sub-
saharan Africa," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 42 (1), pp. 82-98.
Oral, Muhittin, Ossama Kettani, Jean-Claude Cosset, and Mohamed Daouas, 1992, "An
estimation model for country risk rating," International Journal of Forecasting,
Vol. 8, pp. 583-593.
Peter, Marcel, 2002, "Do Rating Agency's and Banks' Sovereign Credit Ratings
Adequately reflect Sovereign Default Risk?," Unpublished manuscript (Geneva:
The Graduate Institute of International Studies).39
Rivoli, Pietra, and Thomas L. Brewer, 1997, "Political Instability and Country Risk,"
Global Finance Journal, Vol. 8 (2), pp. 309-321.
Saini, Krishan G, and Philip S Bates, 1984, "A Survey of the Quantitative Approaches
to Country Risk Analysis," Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 8, pp. 341-
356.
Saini, Krishan G., and Philip S. Bates, 1978, "Statistical techniques for determining
debt-servicing capacity for developing countries: Analytical review of the
literature and further empirical results," Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Research Paper N° 7818 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank).
Sargen, Nicholas, 1977, "Economic Indicators and Country Risk Appraisal," Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, Vol. (Fall), pp. 19-35.
Solberg, Ronald L, 1988, Sovereign Rescheduling: Risk and Portfolio Management
(London: Unwin Hyman).
Sommerville, R. Andrew, and Richard J. Taffler, 1995, "Banker Judgement versus
Formal Forecasting Models: The Case of Country Risk Assessment," Journal of
Banking and Finance, Vol. 19 (2), pp. 281-297.
Standard & Poor's, 1997, "Behind the Ratings. Sovereign Credit Ratings: A Primer,"
Standard & Poor's CreditWeek, Vol. (April 16), pp. 21-28.
Standard & Poor's, 1999a, "1998: Corporate Defaults Rise Sharply," Standard & Poor's
Credit Week, Vol. (March 10), pp. 9-16.
Standard & Poor's, 1999b, "Sovereign Defaults: Hiatus in 2000?," Standard & Poor's
CreditWeek, Vol. (December 22), pp. 9-21.
Standard & Poor's, 2001a, "Ratings Performance 2000 - Default, Transition, Recovery,
and Spreads," Special Report, January (New York: Standard & Poor's).
Standard & Poor's, 2001b, "The Rise and Fall of Sovereign Ratings: 2000," in Ratings
Performance 2000 - Default, Transition, Recovery and Spread, ed. by Standard
& Poor's (New York: Standard & Poor's), pp. 87-92.
Standard & Poor's, 2001c, "Sovereign Defaults Decline Through Third-Quarter 2000,"
in Ratings Performance 2000. Default, Recovery, Transition, and Spreads, ed.
by Standard & Poor's (New York: Standard & Poor's), pp. 93-96.
Stiglitz, Joseph, and Andrew Weiss, 1981, "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information," American Economic Review, Vol. 73 (2), pp. 393-410.
Treasurer's Department, 1998, "Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF,"
Pamphlet Series No. 45 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
World Bank, 2000, Global Development Finance - Country Tables (Washington D.C.:









1 if rescheduling, 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling, 
0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling, 
0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling, 
0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling, 
0 otherwise
1 if arrears, 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling or "upper-tranche" 
IMF arrangements (a), 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling or significant 
arrears on principal or on interest, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling or upper-tranche 
IMF arrangement or significant 
arrears on principal or interest, 0 
otherwise
Total external debt / GDP pos pos pos pos
Total external debt / exports pos pos
Short term debt / total debt
Interest service (due) / exports pos
Principal repayments (due) / exports neg (p) neg (p) neg (p)
Debt service (due) / exports pos pos pos pos pos
Reserves / imports neg neg neg neg (j) neg neg
Exports / GDP
Imports / GDP pos (neg)
Current account / GDP or exports neg (neg) (pos) pos (pos)
Investment / GDP neg
Terms of trade change neg
Private capital inflows/GDP or debt 
service due
neg (l)
GDP (GNP) per capita (pos) (neg)
Variability of GDP per capita growth (neg)
GDP growth rate (neg) (neg) neg (q) neg neg
Export growth rate neg (pos)
Inflation rate (pos) pos
Misalignment of (real) exchange rate pos (o)
Outward orientation (openness)
Arrears / exports 
Growth rate in industrialized 
countries
neg (pos)
Current account / GDP in 
industrialized countries
Real interest rate on international 
lending
pos
Political variables tested. Found 
significant?
yes yes some
Aspects of repayment history tested. 
Found significant? (g) 
Lagged dependent variable (= state 
dependence) tested. Found 
significant?
yes
Country heterogeneity tested. Found 
significant?
% correct predictions (h) 85 n.a. n.a. 94.6 73.3 86.8 85
% type I errors 9.1 n.a. n.a. 7.3 n.a. 11 63
% type II errors 13 n.a. n.a. 5.2 n.a. n.a. 4
Standard logit Standard logit Standard logit Standard probit
Standard logit and 
probit
Standard logit Standard logit
60 5 75 33 35 (i) 52 80
1969-1982 1961-1982 1970-1985 1971-1984 1980-1990 1980-1988 1980-1990
574-670 110 1152 462 327-348 468 880
Notes:
For a detailed discussion of table 1, see section II of the main text.
(a) See Treasurer's Department (1998, pp. 60-73).
(b) These models allow for autocorrelation in the errors.
(c) This parameter was significantly positive in the probit regression of the payments problems dummy on explanatory variables
but significantly negative in the tobit regression of arrears (% of total debt) on explanatory variables.
(d) Debt service due / total external debt.
(e) Reserves / total external debt.
(f) Section IV D.
(g) Cumulative counts of years of IMF upper-tranche arrangements, of reschedulings or of significant arrears.
(h) in the "best" model.
(i) Sub-saharan countries only.
(j) Reserves / total external debt.
(k) Net non-debt creating capital inflows / debt service due.
(l) Gross disbursement of long-term foreign private capital plus net foreign direct investment/GNP.
(m) Foreign direct investment / GDP.
(n) Overvaluation, measured as black market exchange rate premium over official exchange rate.
(o) Rate of real depreciation.
(p) Principal repayments due / total external debt.
(q) Growth rate of per capita GDP.
APPENDIX
Table 1a: Summary of Previous Studies Analysing Sovereign Defaults
Period studied
Total no of observations
Dependent Variable
Explanatory Variables
Goodness of Fit 
No of countries analysed 
Study
Estimation MethodAylward et al. 
(1998) (f)
Hajivassiliou (1987) Li (1992) Callier (1985) Detragiache et al. (2000)
1 if rescheduling, 0 otherwise
1 if arrears, 0 otherwise 1 if arrears, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling or "upper-tranche" 
IMF arrangements (a), 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling (with 
private or public 
creditors) or IMF upper-
tranche arrangement, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling (with 
private or public 
creditors) or IMF upper-
tranche arrangement, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling or significant 
arrears on principal or on interest, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling or 
arrears on imports or 
on interest, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling (with private 
creditors) or arrears of principal and 
interest on external obligations 
towards private creditors > 5% of 
total long term debt service due, or, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling or upper-tranche 
IMF arrangement or significant 
arrears on principal or interest, 0 
otherwise
Total external debt / GDP pos pos pos pos
Total external debt / exports pos
Short term debt / total debt pos
Interest service (due) / exports (pos) pos
Principal repayments (due) / exports (pos)
Debt service (due) / exports (pos) pos pos (d)
Reserves / imports neg (pos) neg neg (e)
Exports / GDP neg (neg)
Imports / GDP (pos) pos
Current account / GDP or exports neg neg
Investment / GDP neg neg
Terms of trade change
Private capital inflows/GDP or debt 
service due
(pos) (m)
GDP (GNP) per capita (neg) neg
Variability of GDP per capita growth
GDP growth rate (neg) (pos) neg (neg)
Export growth rate
Inflation rate (pos)
Misalignment of (real) exchange rate
Outward orientation (openness) neg
Arrears / exports 
Growth rate in industrialized 
countries
neg
Current account / GDP in 
industrialized countries
neg
Real interest rate on international 
lending
(pos)
Political variables tested. Found 
significant?
some
Aspects of repayment history tested. 
Found significant? (g) 
sometimes yes
Lagged dependent variable (= state 
dependence) tested. Found 
significant?
yes
Country heterogeneity tested. Found 
significant?
yes partially
% correct predictions (h) 94.78 n.a. 87.71 88.7 n.a.
% type I errors 8 n.a. 5.67 8.7 n.a.
% type II errors 3 n.a. 25.25 18.8 n.a.
Standard logit (with 
and without lagged 
dependent 
variable)
Standard probit; random 
effects probit; tobit
Fixed effects logit Standard logit
Standard probit; random effects 
probit; fixed effects logit
138 79 19 62 78
1976-1993 1971-1982 1971-1986 1971-1982 1971-1998
1398 823 293 62 612-936
Notes:
For a detailed discussion of table 1, see section II of the main text.
(a) See Treasurer's Department (1998, pp. 60-73).
(b) These models allow for autocorrelation in the errors.
(c) This parameter was significantly positive in the probit regression of the payments problems dummy on explanatory variables
but significantly negative in the tobit regression of arrears (% of total debt) on explanatory variables.
(d) Debt service due / total external debt.
(e) Reserves / total external debt.
(f) Section IV D.
(g) Cumulative counts of years of IMF upper-tranche arrangements, of reschedulings or of significant arrears.
(h) in the "best" model.
(i) Sub-saharan countries only.
(j) Reserves/Total external debt.
(k) Net non-debt creating capital inflows/debt service due.
(l) Gross disbursement of long-term foreign private capital plus net foreign direct investment/GNP.
(m) Foreign direct investment/GDP.
(n) Overvaluation, measured as black market exchange rate premium over official exchange rate.
(o) Rate of real depreciation.
(p) Principal repayments due / total external debt.
(q) Growth rate of per capita GDP.





No of countries analysed 
Period studied
Total no of observations
Goodness of FitMcFadden et al. (1985) Hajivassiliou (1989) Hajivassiliou (1994)
1 if rescheduling, 0 otherwise
1 if arrears, 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling or "upper-tranche" 
IMF arrangements (a), 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling or significant 
arrears on principal or on interest, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling or upper-tranche 
IMF arrangement or significant 
arrears on principal or interest, 0 
otherwise
1 if rescheduling (with private or public 
creditors) or IMF upper-tranche 
arrangement or arrears on interest > 0.1% 
of total external debt or arrears on principal 
> 1% of total external debt, 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling (with private or public 
creditors) or IMF upper-tranche 
arrangement or arrears on interest > 0.1% 
of total external debt or arrears on principal 
> 1% of total external debt, 0 otherwise
1 if rescheduling (with private or 
public creditors) or IMF upper-tranche 
arrangement or arrears on interest > 
0.1% of total external debt or arrears 
on principal > 1% of total external 
debt, 0 otherwise
Total external debt / GDP
Total external debt / exports pos pos pos
Short term debt / total debt
Interest service (due) / exports pos pos
Principal repayments (due) / exports neg neg
Debt service (due) / exports pos (pos)
Reserves / imports neg neg neg
Exports / GDP (neg)
Imports / GDP pos
Current account / GDP or exports (pos)  pos / neg (c)
Investment / GDP
Terms of trade change
Private capital inflows/GDP or debt 
service due
neg (k)
GDP (GNP) per capita neg (neg)
Variability of GDP per capita growth
GDP growth rate neg
Export growth rate
Inflation rate
Misalignment of (real) exchange rate (neg) (n)
Outward orientation (openness) (neg)
Arrears / exports  pos pos
Growth rate in industrialized 
countries
(pos)
Current account / GDP in 
industrialized countries
(neg)
Real interest rate on international 
lending
(neg) (pos)
Political variables tested. Found 
significant?
Aspects of repayment history tested. 
Found significant? (g) 
yes sometimes sometimes
Lagged dependent variable (= state 
dependence) tested. Found 
significant?
yes yes yes
Country heterogeneity tested. Found 
significant?
yes yes yes
% correct predictions (h) 82.55 84.6 86.55
% type I errors 14.49 n.a. n.a.
% type II errors 23.53 n.a. n.a.
Standard logit (with and without lagged 
dependent variable); random effects probit 
(with and without lagged dependent 
variable) 
Random effects probit, RE ordered probit, 
RE tobit  (all with lagged dependent 
variable)
Multi-period probit and multi-period 






For a detailed discussion of table 1, see section II of the main text.
(a) See Treasurer's Department (1998, pp. 60-73).
(b) These models allow for autocorrelation in the errors.
(c) This parameter was significantly positive in the probit regression of the payments problems dummy on explanatory variables
but significantly negative in the tobit regression of arrears (% of total debt) on explanatory variables.
(d) Debt service due / total external debt.
(e) Reserves / total external debt.
(f) Section IV D.
(g) Cumulative counts of years of IMF upper-tranche arrangements, of reschedulings or of significant arrears.
(h) in the "best" model.
(i) Sub-saharan countries only.
(j) Reserves/Total external debt.
(k) Net non-debt creating capital inflows/debt service due.
(l) Gross disbursement of long-term foreign private capital plus net foreign direct investment/GNP.
(m) Foreign direct investment/GDP.
(n) Overvaluation, measured as black market exchange rate premium over official exchange rate.
(o) Rate of real depreciation.
(p) Principal repayments due / total external debt.
(q) Growth rate of per capita GDP.




Total no of observations
Estimation Method
Goodness of Fit
No of countries analysed 
Period studied44
Table 2: The Sample - Initial 150 Countries and 78 Emerging Markets Eventually
Analyzed, 1984-1997







BANGLADESH HONDURAS RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BARBADOS HONG KONG RWANDA
BELARUS HUNGARY SAMOA
BELIZE INDIA SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
BENIN INDONESIA SAUDI ARABIA
BHUTAN IRAN, ISLAMIC REP. SENEGAL
BOLIVIA ISRAEL SEYCHELLES




BURKINA FASO KOREA, REP. OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
BURUNDI KYRGYZ REPUBLIC SOMALIA
CAMBODIA LAO PDR SOUTH AFRICA
CAMEROON LATVIA SRI LANKA
CAPE VERDE LEBANON ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LESOTHO ST. LUCIA
CHAD LIBERIA ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
CHILE LITHUANIA SUDAN
CHINA LIBYA SWAZILAND
COLOMBIA MACEDONIA, FYR SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
COMOROS MADAGASCAR TAIWAN
CONGO, DEM. REP. MALAWI TAJIKISTAN
CONGO, REP. MALAYSIA TANZANIA
COSTA RICA MALDIVES THAILAND
COTE D'IVOIRE MALI TOGO
CROATIA MALTA TONGA
CYPRUS MAURITANIA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
CZECH REPUBLIC MAURITIUS TUNISIA
DJIBOUTI MEXICO TURKEY
DOMINICA MOLDOVA TURKMENISTAN
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MONGOLIA UGANDA
ECUADOR MOROCCO UKRAINE
EGYPT MOZAMBIQUE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
EL SALVADOR MYANMAR URUGUAY






GAMBIA, THE PAKISTAN ZAMBIA
GEORGIA PANAMA ZIMBABWE
Notes:
Countries aligned right and in italics: 12 countries with external debt data from EIU CountryData (Economist Intelligence Unit). Data on 138 other
countries are from Global Development Finance 1999 on CD-Rom.
= 78 emerging markets eventually analyzed.45








































Notes:  Default threshold (“own definition”): increase in arrears/external debt>2% and/or debt rescheduled/external debt>2.5%; Number of
countries analyzed:150. Source for number of defaults by S&P, see Standard & Poor's (2001c), p.94.

















Mean -0.037 0.020 6.348 14.239 31.589 94.688 -0.173 4.862 24.288 3.572 0.564
Median -0.034 -0.035 0.523 4.881 26.301 13.145 -1.094 4.225 24.750 3.274 1.000
Maximum 0.429 4.621 79.289 1021.9 161.0 11749.6 378.961 25.600 39.000 7.728 1.000
Minimum -0.452 -4.344 0 0.188 1.542 -11.686 -96.117 0.194 4.333 0.803 0.000
Std. Dev. 0.068 1.798 12.453 47.910 23.947 660.719 22.981 3.125 5.810 1.875 0.496
Skewness -0.53 0.09 2.850 13.01 1.64 12.91 5.83 2.15 -0.45 0.772 -0.26
Kurtosis 11.33 2.23 11.872 228.13 6.76 190.52 93.65 11.24 3.31 3.452 1.07
Jarque-
Bera 3014 27 5301 2287645 1077 1472086 391531 3833 38 1.511 160
Probability 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.470 0.000
Obser-
vations 807 826 901 837 819 777 886 849 892 14 872
Notes: 
(a) For an explanation of the explanatory variables, see section III C.46
Table 4: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: Sovereign default (DOREDT3ME)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




















CONSTANT -4.1127 *** n.a. -2.8342 *** n.a. -3.7256 *** n.a.
(-5.47) (-4.07) (-5.22)
CAGDPN -0.0767 *** -0.01602 -0.0636 ** -0.01196 -0.0685 *** -0.01357
(-2.8) (-2.48) (-2.68)
LDEBST2 0.1900 ** 0.03650 0.2274 *** 0.03864 0.2024 ** 0.03803
(2.12) (3.26) (2.24)
LDGNP 
(b) 0.00042 0.00044 0.00043
LDEXP 
(b) 0.00010 0.00011 0.00011
LARREDT 0.0746 ** 0.01536 0.2660 *** 0.04701 0.0684 ** 0.01283
(2.5) (4.39) (2.51)
M2IR 0.0627 *** 0.01271 0.0514 *** 0.00870 0.0667 *** 0.01221
(2.96) (5.5) (3.11)
CRPRIV 0.0198 ** 0.00389 0.0023 0.00040
(2.56) (0.49)
CPIINF2 0.0172 *** 0.00351 0.0194 *** 0.00344 0.0119 *** 0.00227
(2.95) (4.07) (2.58)
(DRER2HP)^2 
(c) 0.0011 ** 0.00007 0.0006 ** 0.00004 0.0008 * 0.00005
(2.02) (2.3) (1.85)
VGNPCAPG2 0.1371 ** 0.02667 0.3269 *** 0.05601 0.1349 ** 0.02471
(2.39) (7.19) (2.47)
POLRISK6 -0.1244 *** -0.02532 -0.0673 *** -0.01258 -0.0904 *** -0.01752
(-3.94) (-3.06) (-3.55)
LIB6MRE1 0.4471 *** 0.09099 0.2306 *** 0.04085 0.4123 *** 0.07901
(5.59) (4.08) (5.45)
L3DOREDT3ME 
(d) 4.5237 *** 0.68542 4.1661 *** 0.69870
(10.38) (10.53)
McFadden R-squared 0.65 0.44 0.64
S.E. of regression 0.26 0.34 0.26
Akaike 0.50 0.77 0.51
LR statistic 628.2 433.4 619.8
P-value of LR stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 717 735 724
Percent correct classifications 92.05 84.63 91.71
Percent type I errors 5.28 14.86 5.20
Percent type II errors 12.10 16.20 13.12
Obs with Dep=0 281 284 282
Obs with Dep=1 436 451 442
Mean dep. var. 0.61 0.61 0.61
Notes:
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood - Binary Logit. t-statistics (in parentheses) are derived using robust QML (Huber/White) standard errors.
Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(a) Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the explanatory variables, except for the dummy l3doredt3me (default over the past three
years) where 0 was taken instead of the sample mean, which is 0.56.
(b) Lagged debt-GNP and debt-exports ratios: in order to gain a better impression of the economic significance of the debt stock indicator LDEBST2,
the marginal effects have been calculated for the two components individually.
(c) The marginal effect is evaluated at the absolute value of DRER2HP (instead of at DRER2HP^2).
(d) As suggested by Greene (2000, p. 817), this marginal effect is calculated as the default probability when l3doredt3me = 1 minus the default
probability when l3doredt3me = 0, the other explanatory variables being equal to their sample means.47
Table 5: 3-Year-Ahead Default Probabilities (in %) of Model 3
In-Sample Default Probabilities (DPs) Out-of-Sample DPs
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ALGERIA 20.39 10.81 3.64 2.64 4.35 85.85 64.59 69.26 81.52 71.77 53.49
ANGOLA 100.00 100.00 99.99 99.99 99.99 100.00
ARGENTINA 100.00 98.96 94.72 95.80 90.42 94.11 91.76 23.47 16.64 9.13 18.15
AZERBAIJAN                 99.65 96.71 91.49
BAHRAIN 5.53 8.02 3.56 1.37 1.96 2.05 2.50 5.30 9.21 2.32 1.82
BANGLADESH 16.90 6.37 1.68 0.88 1.43 3.76 3.94 4.46 2.92 2.01 5.38
BOLIVIA 88.98 84.32 67.52 63.79 55.19 71.56 72.71 76.00 66.24 50.49 71.96
BOTSWANA 1.96 0.64 0.34 0.38 0.93 1.48 0.93 0.86 0.96 0.36 1.02
BRAZIL 100.00 99.81 100.00 100.00 100.00 86.85 81.75 80.08 4.07 3.27 7.21
BULGARIA 94.19 99.70 99.71 90.57 86.88 99.97 73.64 56.95 85.58
CAMEROON 88.40 83.61 80.20 65.07 91.47 83.62 90.15 92.80 82.33 75.99 86.74
CHILE 63.23 45.28 26.73 28.55 1.05 1.70 1.71 2.27 1.66 0.94 2.48
CHINA 5.85 2.91 2.05 4.21 4.05 4.08 3.22 3.48 3.48 2.58 6.13
COLOMBIA 71.91 47.43 0.48 0.82 1.52 2.98 4.17 11.42 8.60 3.65 8.48
COSTA RICA 30.27 26.56 34.57 1.82 1.97 2.50 1.45 0.75 2.37
COTE D'IVOIRE 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 95.06 93.42 92.43 92.64 71.13 53.66 94.99
CROATIA                 88.82 75.73 7.62
CYPRUS 3.00 3.06 1.19 0.50 1.02 2.39 2.44 3.06 2.58 1.01 2.95
CZECH REPUBLIC 3.10 3.46 1.57 0.58 2.71
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 98.64 95.99 83.62 79.50 91.63 86.65 88.02 88.97 75.92 62.66 82.80
ECUADOR 94.50 94.79 90.57 92.58 95.37 97.26 67.62 83.84 85.55 68.87 95.70
EGYPT 97.75 86.75 37.95 28.35 34.31 1.66 2.07 3.36 2.51 1.20 2.48
EL SALVADOR 11.52 83.80 59.67 46.65 48.48 58.83 57.36 2.36 1.32 0.82 2.38
ESTONIA                 7.98 1.49 4.98
GABON 90.88 84.16 84.25 82.57 94.68 74.68 48.51 74.25 88.30 64.31 68.29
GHANA 6.09 3.14 1.28 1.69 4.61 4.52 5.65 11.42 8.33 7.70 10.53
GUATEMALA 97.56 91.82 82.04 77.78 76.15 83.91 80.36 86.71 7.30 4.00 9.27
HONDURAS 98.51 92.59 73.68 77.34 88.32 86.24 88.75 9.62 77.93 80.65 86.82
HONG KONG 1.08 1.96 2.12 1.06 3.28
HUNGARY 5.00 3.08 1.18 1.90 2.43 3.03 2.47 3.09 1.42 0.68 2.41
INDIA 20.64 11.50 2.91 1.75 1.77 2.58 2.93 3.95 2.90 1.57 4.26
INDONESIA 5.94 2.44 1.02 1.04 2.13 5.60 5.84 6.08 95.02 10.92 92.22
ISRAEL 8.21 3.90 0.71 0.73 1.33 2.75 2.99 3.45 1.72 1.22 3.10
JAMAICA 93.78 88.57 64.44 54.13 61.72 68.85 69.52 81.83 68.38 1.78 4.14
JORDAN 97.10 97.12 95.24 88.75 82.38 83.34 75.20 78.39 67.89 31.47 65.07
KAZAKHSTAN                 7.38 1.87 80.21
KENYA 12.05 13.03 18.26 69.73 71.25 77.39 67.97 8.21 7.35 66.79 87.51
KOREA, REP. OF 3.39 2.16 0.51 0.44 0.85 1.35 1.49 1.41 1.47 0.69 1.96
LATVIA                 21.76 3.80 10.12
LEBANON 99.52 99.71 98.35 37.32 38.01 37.24 33.18 9.47 3.86 8.94
LIBYA 97.52 98.68 99.31 97.10 97.25
LITHUANIA                 14.36 5.47 6.57
MALAWI 79.37 84.40 7.58 5.78 20.21 23.92 21.75 25.75 8.14 7.45 24.92
MALAYSIA 2.67 2.10 0.57 0.47 0.85 2.09 1.73 1.99 1.06 0.50 2.24
MEXICO 68.47 59.75 45.22 35.61 2.08 5.72 4.42 4.49 3.17 1.94 4.17
MOLDOVA                 97.99 93.79 98.44
MOROCCO 84.11 78.53 51.95 43.67 58.59 81.12 6.19 8.15 4.97 2.43 7.89
MYANMAR 99.01 99.00 97.25 96.92 97.44 98.90 98.41 99.48 75.24 98.31 99.49
NAMIBIA 1.48 1.46 2.12 0.90 0.68 1.53
NICARAGUA 100.00 99.95 99.92 99.95 99.98 99.94 99.72 99.21 99.58 99.67
NIGERIA 59.70 77.92 83.89 87.83 99.11 99.63 95.36 98.82 99.54 98.71 98.97
OMAN 1.97 0.75 1.09 1.40 2.74 1.74 2.24 7.07 0.80 0.53
PAKISTAN 23.29 13.22 4.64 4.58 3.89 7.64 13.12 8.58 8.19 75.11 93.32
PANAMA 98.99 99.48 99.06 98.39 99.17 99.11 99.38 80.97 4.68 2.71 4.80
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 5.54 7.84 1.89 1.38 2.73 2.23 3.48 8.30 6.19 3.65 93.72
PARAGUAY 89.92 84.10 64.33 36.32 1.89 2.24 2.80 3.61 2.72 1.95 8.3248
In-Sample Default Probabilities (DPs) Out-of-Sample DPs
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
PERU 100.00 100.00 99.66 98.74 99.06 99.07 97.81 91.48 84.83 68.42 85.62
PHILIPPINES 95.18 86.15 51.92 50.04 59.42 67.15 4.43 3.84 1.41 0.37 1.02
POLAND 100.00 97.20 85.63 63.94 53.19 48.26 60.86 61.19 1.09 0.65 1.95
QATAR 10.19 9.25 2.70 2.94 9.69 17.66 10.88 25.15 8.49 1.39 1.40
ROMANIA 12.57 33.90 83.79 17.65 6.51 5.22 6.84 23.93 8.41 2.39 7.78
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 100.00 99.17 99.75 99.69 99.80 97.14 83.79 81.60
SAUDI ARABIA 5.58 11.83 2.07 1.84 3.15 4.23 2.47 3.79 5.23 1.43 1.60
SENEGAL 80.92 67.01 50.50 54.36 83.58 77.94 67.47 74.37 65.92 58.52 77.41
SINGAPORE 0.83 0.42 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.21
SLOVAKIA 5.67 7.46 3.79 1.01 2.25
SLOVENIA                 1.35 0.64 1.92
SOUTH AFRICA 3.93 2.75 1.33 3.56
SRI LANKA 10.17 4.44 1.32 1.03 1.77 2.53 3.90 79.03 65.74 54.61 8.68
SUDAN 99.98 99.98 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.98 99.94 99.97
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 10.05 92.50 86.98 84.45 94.70 95.43 95.72 98.21 98.58 97.64 98.90
TAIWAN 1.22 0.95 0.38 0.32 0.49 0.89 0.70 0.94 0.75 0.33 1.03
TANZANIA 98.48 96.62 96.51 98.95 98.66 98.63 98.46 99.23 98.26 92.72 96.52
THAILAND 5.98 4.76 1.34 0.98 1.88 3.79 3.60 2.80 2.36 1.26 2.27
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 66.81 75.77 65.07 60.57 65.62 3.96 4.48 13.12 7.38 1.21 1.67
TUNISIA 7.39 4.77 2.18 1.71 1.63 2.94 2.79 3.78 2.50 1.20 3.09
TURKEY 16.49 7.55 1.53 1.94 5.46 9.11 10.82 20.44 14.36 7.91 14.35
UGANDA 93.78 97.70 95.60 87.88 72.84 84.86 82.43 89.67 82.15 75.57 88.36
UKRAINE                 88.95 3.82 96.69
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2.05 0.49 0.30 1.41 1.32 0.97 1.37 3.09 1.18 1.02
URUGUAY 86.32 76.73 47.82 45.14 57.29 3.67 2.80 3.33 1.76 1.02 2.69
VENEZUELA 74.70 69.65 65.15 67.41 5.67 7.29 5.36 7.76 10.71 5.98 9.82
VIET NAM 99.91 99.91 99.99 100.00 99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.83 99.78 99.94
YEMEN 99.80 100.00 100.00 99.51 98.30 99.60 91.18 93.72 77.69
YUGOSLAVIA 99.98 99.99 99.99 99.99 100.00
ZAMBIA 99.65 98.85 98.19 97.70 93.73 94.36 91.37 94.63 92.76 93.94 85.53
ZIMBABWE 7.39 4.31 3.68 1.67 2.97 5.62 7.32 17.83 15.16 10.13 25.6849
Table 6: Out-of-Sample Performance of Model 3 in 1997

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ALGERIA 69.26 1 1 0 0 0 1
ANGOLA 99.99 1 1 0 0 0 1
ARGENTINA 23.47 0 0 1 0 0 1
BAHRAIN 5.30 0 0 1 0 0 1
BANGLADESH 4.46 0 0 1 0 0 1
BOLIVIA 76.00 1 1 0 0 0 1
BOTSWANA 0.86 0 0 1 0 0 1
BRAZIL 80.08 0 1 0 1 0 0
BULGARIA 99.97 1 1 0 0 0 1
CAMEROON 92.80 1 1 0 0 0 1
CHILE 2.27 0 0 1 0 0 1
CHINA 3.48 0 0 1 0 0 1
COLOMBIA 11.42 0 0 1 0 0 1
COSTA RICA 2.50 0 0 1 0 0 1
COTE D'IVOIRE 92.64 1 1 0 0 0 1
CYPRUS 3.06 0 0 1 0 0 1
CZECH REPUBLIC 3.46 0 0 1 0 0 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 88.97 1 1 0 0 0 1
ECUADOR 83.84 1 1 0 0 0 1
EGYPT 3.36 0 0 1 0 0 1
EL SALVADOR 2.36 0 0 1 0 0 1
GABON 74.25 1 1 0 0 0 1
GHANA 11.42 0 0 1 0 0 1
GUATEMALA 86.71 0 1 0 1 0 0
HONDURAS 9.62 1 0 1 0 1 0
HONG KONG 1.96 0 0 1 0 0 1
HUNGARY 3.09 0 0 1 0 0 1
INDIA 3.95 0 0 1 0 0 1
INDONESIA 6.08 1 0 1 0 1 0
ISRAEL 3.45 0 0 1 0 0 1
JAMAICA 81.83 0 1 0 1 0 0
JORDAN 78.39 1 1 0 0 0 1
KENYA 8.21 1 0 1 0 1 0
KOREA, REP. OF 1.41 0 0 1 0 0 1
LEBANON 33.18 0 0 1 0 0 1
LIBYA 98.68 1 1 0 0 0 1
MALAWI 25.75 0 0 1 0 0 1
MALAYSIA 1.99 0 0 1 0 0 1
MEXICO 4.49 0 0 1 0 0 1
MOROCCO 8.15 0 0 1 0 0 1
MYANMAR 99.48 1 1 0 0 0 1
NAMIBIA 2.12 0 0 1 0 0 1
NICARAGUA 99.72 1 1 0 0 0 1
NIGERIA 98.82 1 1 0 0 0 1
OMAN 2.24 0 0 1 0 0 1
PAKISTAN 8.58 1 0 1 0 1 0
PANAMA 80.97 0 1 0 1 0 0
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 8.30 1 0 1 0 1 0
PARAGUAY 3.61 0 0 1 0 0 1
PERU 91.48 1 1 0 0 0 1
PHILIPPINES 3.84 0 0 1 0 0 1
POLAND 61.19 0 1 0 1 0 0

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ROMANIA 23.93 0 0 1 0 0 1
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 99.80 1 1 0 0 0 1
SAUDI ARABIA 3.79 0 0 1 0 0 1
SENEGAL 74.37 1 1 0 0 0 1
SINGAPORE 0.24 0 0 1 0 0 1
SLOVAKIA 7.46 0 0 1 0 0 1
SOUTH AFRICA 3.93 0 0 1 0 0 1
SRI LANKA 79.03 0 1 0 1 0 0
SUDAN 99.99 1 1 0 0 0 1
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 98.21 1 1 0 0 0 1
TAIWAN 0.94 0 0 1 0 0 1
TANZANIA 99.23 1 1 0 0 0 1
THAILAND 2.80 0 0 1 0 0 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 13.12 0 0 1 0 0 1
TUNISIA 3.78 0 0 1 0 0 1
TURKEY 20.44 0 0 1 0 0 1
UGANDA 89.67 1 1 0 0 0 1
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1.37 0 0 1 0 0 1
URUGUAY 3.33 0 0 1 0 0 1
VENEZUELA 7.76 0 0 1 0 0 1
VIET NAM 100.00 1 1 0 0 0 1
YEMEN 99.60 1 1 0 0 0 1
YUGOSLAVIA 99.99 1 1 0 0 0 1
ZAMBIA 94.63 1 1 0 0 0 1
ZIMBABWE 17.83 0 0 1 0 0 1
# of countries 78
# of defaults in 97-99 30
# of non-defaults in 97-99 48
# of predicted defaults 31
# of predicted non-defaults 47
# of false alarms (type II errors) 6 12.5
# of defaults not predicted (type I errors) 5 16.7
# of correct predictions 67 85.951
Table 7: Out-of-Sample Performance of Model 3 in 1998
















(1)          (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ALGERIA 81.52 0 1 0 1 0 0
ANGOLA 99.99 1 1 0 0 0 1
ARGENTINA 16.64 0 0 1 0 0 1
AZERBAIJAN 99.65 1 1 0 0 0 1
BAHRAIN 9.21 0 0 1 0 0 1
BANGLADESH 2.92 0 0 1 0 0 1
BOLIVIA 66.24 1 1 0 0 0 1
BOTSWANA 0.96 0 0 1 0 0 1
BRAZIL 4.07 0 0 1 0 0 1
BULGARIA 73.64 0 1 0 1 0 0
CAMEROON 82.33 1 1 0 0 0 1
CHILE 1.66 0 0 1 0 0 1
CHINA 3.48 0 0 1 0 0 1
COLOMBIA 8.60 0 0 1 0 0 1
COSTA RICA 1.45 0 0 1 0 0 1
COTE D'IVOIRE 71.13 1 1 0 0 0 1
CROATIA 88.82 0 1 0 1 0 0
CYPRUS 2.58 0 0 1 0 0 1
CZECH REPUBLIC 1.57 0 0 1 0 0 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 75.92 0 1 0 1 0 0
ECUADOR 85.55 1 1 0 0 0 1
EGYPT 2.51 0 0 1 0 0 1
EL SALVADOR 1.32 0 0 1 0 0 1
ESTONIA 7.98 0 0 1 0 0 1
GABON 88.30 1 1 0 0 0 1
GHANA 8.33 0 0 1 0 0 1
GUATEMALA 7.30 0 0 1 0 0 1
HONDURAS 77.93 1 1 0 0 0 1
HONG KONG 2.12 0 0 1 0 0 1
HUNGARY 1.42 0 0 1 0 0 1
INDIA 2.90 0 0 1 0 0 1
INDONESIA 95.02 1 1 0 0 0 1
ISRAEL 1.72 0 0 1 0 0 1
JAMAICA 68.38 0 1 0 1 0 0
JORDAN 67.89 1 1 0 0 0 1
KAZAKHSTAN 7.38 1 0 1 0 1 0
KENYA 7.35 1 0 1 0 1 0
KOREA, REP. OF 1.47 0 0 1 0 0 1
LATVIA 21.76 0 0 1 0 0 1
LEBANON 9.47 0 0 1 0 0 1
LIBYA 99.31 1 1 0 0 0 1
LITHUANIA 14.36 0 0 1 0 0 1
MALAWI 8.14 0 0 1 0 0 1
MALAYSIA 1.06 0 0 1 0 0 1
MEXICO 3.17 0 0 1 0 0 1
MOLDOVA 97.99 1 1 0 0 0 1
MOROCCO 4.97 0 0 1 0 0 1
MYANMAR 75.24 1 1 0 0 0 1
NAMIBIA 0.90 0 0 1 0 0 1
NICARAGUA 99.21 1 1 0 0 0 1
NIGERIA 99.54 1 1 0 0 0 1
OMAN 7.07 0 0 1 0 0 1
PAKISTAN 8.19 1 0 1 0 1 0
PANAMA 4.68 0 0 1 0 0 1
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 6.19 1 0 1 0 1 0
PARAGUAY 2.72 0 0 1 0 0 1
















(1)          (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PHILIPPINES 1.41 0 0 1 0 0 1
POLAND 1.09 0 0 1 0 0 1
QATAR 8.49 0 0 1 0 0 1
ROMANIA 8.41 0 0 1 0 0 1
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 97.14 1 1 0 0 0 1
SAUDI ARABIA 5.23 0 0 1 0 0 1
SENEGAL 65.92 1 1 0 0 0 1
SINGAPORE 0.11 0 0 1 0 0 1
SLOVAKIA 3.79 0 0 1 0 0 1
SLOVENIA 1.35 0 0 1 0 0 1
SOUTH AFRICA 2.75 0 0 1 0 0 1
SRI LANKA 65.74 0 1 0 1 0 0
SUDAN 99.98 1 1 0 0 0 1
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 98.58 1 1 0 0 0 1
TAIWAN 0.75 0 0 1 0 0 1
TANZANIA 98.26 1 1 0 0 0 1
THAILAND 2.36 0 0 1 0 0 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 7.38 0 0 1 0 0 1
TUNISIA 2.50 0 0 1 0 0 1
TURKEY 14.36 0 0 1 0 0 1
UGANDA 82.15 1 1 0 0 0 1
UKRAINE 88.95 1 1 0 0 0 1
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 3.09 0 0 1 0 0 1
URUGUAY 1.76 0 0 1 0 0 1
VENEZUELA 10.71 0 0 1 0 0 1
VIET NAM 99.83 1 1 0 0 0 1
YEMEN 91.18 1 1 0 0 0 1
YUGOSLAVIA 99.99 1 1 0 0 0 1
ZAMBIA 92.76 1 1 0 0 0 1
ZIMBABWE 15.16 1 0 1 0 1 0
# of countries 87
# of defaults in 99-00 31
# of non-defaults in 98-00 56
# of predicted defaults 33
# of predicted non-defaults 54
# of false alarms (type II errors) 7 12.5
# of defaults not predicted (type I errors) 5 16.1
# of correct predictions 75 86.253
Table 8: Average 3-Year Cumulative Default Rates by Letter Rating,










3-Year Cumulative Default Rates
Aaa 0.00% AAA 0.05%
Aa1 0.00% AA+ 0.00%
Aa2 0.06% AA 0.00%
Aa3 0.19% AA- 0.18%
A1 0.33% A+ 0.16%
A2 0.14% A 0.14%
A3 0.25% A- 0.35%
Baa1 0.52% BBB+ 0.59%
Baa2 0.60% BBB 0.71%
Baa3 1.34% BBB- 0.99%
Ba1 3.86% BB+ 3.15%
Ba2 5.05% BB 4.13%
Ba3 11.89% BB- 6.79%
B1 14.81% B+ 10.43%
B2 20.28% B 20.41%
B3 27.27% B- 22.37%
Caa1-C 34.23% CCC-C 33.11%
Sources and Notes:
For Moody’s ratings, the corresponding default rates are calculated on the basis of the credit experiences that
15’700 companies and sovereigns rated by Moody’s made on their publicly issued senior unsecured long-term
bonds between 1919 and the end of 1999 (See Moody's Investors Service (2000), pp. 8-10 & 27).
For Standard & Poor’s ratings, the corresponding default rates are calculated on the basis of the credit experiences
that the 7300 corporate holders of  S&P’s long-term issuer ratings made between 1981 and the end of 1997 (See
Standard & Poor's (1999a), pp. 10-15).54
Table 9: Model 3 Default Probabilities vs. Rating Agencies’ Default Rates before Asian
Crisis
(40 emerging markets rated by either Moody’s or S&P’s at end 1996)
3-Year Cumulative Default Probability / Rate Ratings Jan 1, 1997
(Long-term Sovereign FX)
 
Model 3  DP in
1996 Moody's DR S&P’s DR Moody's S&P's
ARGENTINA 91.76 14.81 6.79 B1 BB-
BAHRAIN 2.50 3.86 -- Ba1  --
BRAZIL 81.75 14.81 10.43 B1 B+
BULGARIA 86.88 27.27 -- B3  --
CHILE 1.71 0.52 0.35 Baa1 A-
CHINA 3.22 0.25 0.71 A3 BBB
COLOMBIA 4.17 1.34 0.99 Baa3 BBB-
CYPRUS 2.44 0.14 0.18 A2 AA-
CZECH REPUBLIC 3.10 0.52 0.14 Baa1 A
EGYPT 2.07 5.05 -- Ba2 -- 
EL SALVADOR 57.36 -- 4.13  -- BB
HONG KONG 1.08 0.25 0.14 A3 A
HUNGARY 2.47 1.34 0.99 Baa3 BBB-
INDIA 2.93 1.34 -- Baa3  --
INDONESIA 5.84 1.34 0.71 Baa3 BBB
ISRAEL 2.99 0.25 0.35 A3 A-
JORDAN 75.20 11.89 6.79 Ba3 BB-
KOREA, REP. OF 1.49 0.33 0.18 A1 AA-
MALAYSIA 1.73 0.33 0.16 A1 A+
MEXICO 4.42 5.05 4.13 Ba2 BB
OMAN 1.74 0.60 0.99 Baa2 BBB-
PAKISTAN 13.12 -- 10.43 --  B+
PARAGUAY 2.80 -- 6.79 --  BB-
PERU 97.81 20.28 -- B2 -- 
PHILIPPINES 4.43 5.05 6.79 Ba2 BB-
POLAND 60.86 1.34 0.99 Baa3 BBB-
QATAR 10.88 0.6 0.71 Baa2 BBB
ROMANIA 6.84 11.89 6.79 Ba3 BB-
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 99.69 5.05 6.79 Ba2 BB-
SAUDI ARABIA 2.47 1.34 -- Baa3  --
SINGAPORE 0.22 0.00 0.05 Aa1 AAA
SLOVAKIA 5.67 1.34 0.99 Baa3 BBB-
TAIWAN 0.70 0.19 0.00 Aa3 AA+
THAILAND 3.60 0.14 0.14 A2 A
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 4.48 3.86 3.15 Ba1 BB+
TUNISIA 2.79 1.34 -- Baa3  --
TURKEY 10.82 11.89 20.41 Ba3 B
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 0.97 0.52 -- Baa1 -- 
URUGUAY 2.80 3.86 3.15 Ba1 BB+
VENEZUELA 5.36 5.05 20.41 Ba2 B
Notes: 
   = Countries with estimated DP > available DRs
   = Countries with estimated DP < available DRs
   = Countries with estimated DP in-between DRs of rating agencies
   = Asian crisis countries and Russia55
Table 10: Model 3 Default Probabilities vs. Rating Agencies’ Default Rates at Beginning of
2001
(25 emerging markets with largest liabilities towards BIS reporting banks in 2000)
3-Year Cumulative Default Probability /
Rate
Ratings Jan 1, 2001 (Long-
term Sovereign FX) Memo items
Model 3 DP









ARGENTINA 18.15 14.81 6.79 B1 BB-                     67.0 *                  23.5
BRAZIL 7.21 14.81 6.79 B1 BB-                     67.7                  10.8
CHILE 2.48 0.52 0.35 Baa1 A-                     22.3                  31.7
CHINA 6.13 0.25 0.71 A3 BBB                     58.3                    5.3
COLOMBIA 8.48 5.05 4.13 Ba2 BB                     11.6                  14.2
CZECH REPUBLIC 2.71 0.52 0.35 Baa1 A-                     11.4                  22.5
HONG KONG 3.28 0.25 0.14 A3 A                   110.0                  67.4
HUNGARY 2.41 0.25 0.35 A3 A-                     16.9                  37.1
INDIA 4.26 5.05 4.13 Ba2 BB                     22.2                    4.7
INDONESIA 92.22 27.27 22.37 B3 B-                     40.3                  26.3
KOREA, REP. OF 1.96 0.60 0.71 Baa2 BBB                     58.8                  12.9
MALAYSIA 2.24 0.60 0.71 Baa2 BBB                     20.9                  23.3
MEXICO 4.17 1.34 3.15 Baa3 BB+                     63.7                  11.1
PANAMA** 4.80 3.86 3.15 Ba1*** BB+                     31.0                311.4
PERU 85.62 11.89 6.79 Ba3 BB-                     13.2                  24.7
PHILIPPINES 1.02 3.86 3.15 Ba1 BB+                     16.5                  22.1
POLAND 1.95 0.52 0.59 Baa1 BBB+                     22.2                  14.1
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 81.60 20.28 22.37 B2 B-                     39.6                  15.8
SAUDI ARABIA 1.60 1.34 -- Baa3 --                     16.8                    9.7
SINGAPORE** 0.21 0.00 0.00 Aa1 AAA                   100.1                108.5
SOUTH AFRICA 3.56 1.34 0.99 Baa3 BBB-                     18.3                  14.5
TAIWAN 1.03 0.19 0.00 Aa3 AA+                     18.1                    5.8
THAILAND 2.27 1.34 0.99 Baa3 BBB-                     26.7                  21.8
TURKEY 14.35 14.81 10.43 B1 B+                     47.4                  23.3
VENEZUELA 9.82 20.28 20.41 B2 B                     13.2                  10.9
Notes:
 = Countries with predicted DP > available DRs
   = Countries with predicted DP < available DRs
   = Countries with predicted DP in-between DRs of rating agencies
* 1999 (data for 2000 not available)
** Off-shore centers
*** Long-term foreign currency government bond rating (for all other countries: FX country ceiling for bonds and notes)